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ABSTRACT 
My dissertation analyzes investment decisions made by firms. 
Chapter 1 develops a dynamic structural model of a single agent decision in order 
to analyze the effect of voluntary export restrains (VERs) on quality-upgrade and 
foreign direct investment (FDI) behavior. I estimate the model parameters using a 
variant of the two-step estimator developed by Bajari, Benkard and Levin (2007). 
Using panel data of Japanese firms in t he U.S . automobile industry, both activities 
are found to have significant sunk costs, which introduces inter-temporal interactions 
in decisions. I simulate counterfactuals based on the estimation of the structural 
model. In the absence of the VERs, both quality-upgrade and the probability of 
undertaking FDI decrease. The second simulation examines the substitut ion effect 
between the two investment activities . The proposal to restrict FDI policy causes a 
dramatic increase in the level of quality-upgrade. Similarly, the proposal to restrict 
quality-upgrade policy results in an increase in the probability of FDI. 
Chapter 2 examines the trade-off of developing a brand facing a firm . Establish-
ing the brand on the one hand reduces liquidity risk perceived by investors through 
effective marketing, but on the other hand increases market risk through incurring a 
v 
substantial advertising expenditure to accumulate intangible assets. I estimate t he 
model parameters using a new liquidity-augmented Capital Asset Pricing Model de-
veloped by Liu (2006). I find that as advertising expenditure increases, t he brand 
lowers liquidity risk associated with perceived risk by consumers and investors , but 
increases market risk associated with asset-market structure. 
Chapter 3 presents a theoretical model of negligence and causation by a firm and 
examines the influence of the causation test on t he level of the firm 's investment for 
care under negligence. In this model, a firm's decision to take care reduces the likeli-
hood of an accident only in the event that some nondeterministic intervention occurs . 
The effects of the causation test depend on the information available to t he court , 
and the manner in which the test is implemented . The key effect of the causation test 
is to induce firms to take into account the distribution of the intervention probability 
as well as its expected value. 
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Chapter 1 
Investments in Response to Thade Policy: 
The Case of Japanese Firms during Voluntary 
Export Restraints 
1.1 Introduction 
Restrictions on exports to a particular country often have the unintended conse-
quence of affecting the investment choices of foreign firms that sell to that country. 
An interesting and very well-known narrative from the past involves the responses of 
Japanese auto producers when the U.S. and Japan placed bilateral voluntary export 
restraints (VERs) on exports of automobiles from Japan to the U.S. during the 1980s. 
First , they were likely to upgrade their product quality levels by adopting new tech-
nologies and shifting to higher quality auto exports , which gave them higher profit 
margins . Second, they tended to establish manufacturing plants in the U.S. via for-
eign direct investment (FDI) because Japanese automobile products made in the U.S. 
were excluded from export restraints. In so doing, they were able to raise profits de-
spite the trade restrictions by increasing product prices as a result of quality-upgrade 
and/or by selling more cars made in the U.S. as a result of the capacity expansion. 
When Japanese firms decide to invest in quality-upgrade and/or to participate in FDI, 
they may incur significant sunk costs, which ultimately introduce inter-temporal link-
2 
ages in the decisions . This implies that the firms have to consider how their current 
investment decisions would affect future investment plans as well as future market 
profits before these decisions are made. This chapter represents the first attempt 
to investigate investment decisions for quality-upgrade and FDI in the context of a 
certain trade restriction by linking a dynamic analysis to real market data. 
Despite the coexistence of quality-upgrade and FDI activities, together with their 
inter-temporal interactions, the previous literature that has examined the investment 
behavior of Japanese firms has largely focused on each channel in isolation. The ap-
proach that has been taken to date of examining these factors in themselves rather 
than in their interaction has prompted the following research questions for this study. 
First, how do Japanese firms make quality-upgrade and FDI decisions, as possible in-
vestment strategies to overcome the trade restriction? Understanding the investment 
behavior of firms is crucial in exploring the profound implications for trade restrictions 
on product quality and FDI entry of Japanese firms into the U.S. Second, what would 
have happened if the trade restrictions (VERs) had never been in place? Although 
trade restriction is the major factor driving investment decisions, other state charac-
teristics may be important as well to encourage Japanese firms ' investment actions . 
For instance, most of the trade literature on exports and FDI explain that the firms 
that have a large enough scale (large market share because they are highly produc-
tive) find it optimal to perform FDI rather than export if a foreign production plant 
allows to save on the transportation cost of exports. This is known as the proximity-
concentration trade-off. Thus, I am interested in how much both quality-upgrade and 
the probability of FDI will decrease in the market if the VERs are not allowed to 
operate and also if the VERs, combined with some state characteristics, are not al-
lowed to operate, to capture the proximity-concentration trade-off effect. Third, what 
happens if one of the investment policies (quality-upgrade or capacity expansion via 
3 
FDI) is restricted? If two investment decisions can be substit uted for one another, 
restricting one of the investment activities will increase t he other investment strategy. 
Or if the two investment decisions exhibit some complementarity, this mechanism will 
have a negative impact on the other investment strategy. Alternatively, it could be 
t hat quality-upgrade and FDI are not affected by each other. 
The first st ep in answering the above questions is to structurally model invest-
ment decisions regarding quality-upgrade and capacity expansion via FDI. These in-
vestment decisions, however, involve a complicated optimal decision-making process 
because product quality and U.S . production are not exogenously given. To address 
this complexity, I develop a dynamic model of a single agent investment decision of 
quality-upgrade and FDI entry. The model contains four key features . First , it endo-
genizes firms' quality-upgrade and capacity expansion (FDI) decisions. Both quality 
levels and U.S. production are not exogenously given; rather they are optimally cho-
sen based on firms' quality-upgrade and firm 's FDI entry, respectively. Second, t he 
model employs both continuous and discrete choices of investment. That is , firms are 
able to choose quality-upgrade as a continuous choice and FDI entry as a discrete 
choice in each period. Third, it allows for different cost structures between quality-
upgrade and FDI decisions . Specifically, I allow the fixed quality adjustment cost 
depending on firms ' quality-upgrade level and the FDI entry cost depending on FDI 
entry choice. Finally, the model identifies various state characteristics that may en-
courage Japanese firms to invest in either quality-upgrade or capacity expansion via 
FDI because the trade restriction alone does not account for subsequent investment 
activities , since the nature of those activities vary, given firm heterogeneity. As the 
U.S. dollar depreciation against the Japanese yen in 1985 and 1986 could have cat-
alyzed FDI decisions of Japanese producers given relatively cheaper costs, I consider 
the Japan/U.S. foreign exchange rates as one of the state characteristics. There was 
4 
no specific enforcement mechanism for the VER limits, which implies that Japanese 
firms did not necessarily have to conform to the VERs 1 However, an ex-post penalty 
would have been imposed if exports had failed to meet the required limits, although 
this penalty was not explicitly announced. Accordingly, I use the difference between 
exports and the limits for each Japanese firm to capture the possibility of a penalty 
imposition. A firm's higher relative quality level compared to the quality level of 
other Japanese firms might encourage the firm to invest in building production plants 
but discourage the firm from upgrading product quality because it knows that its 
products are already good enough to be marketable in terms of quality. Last, I ac-
count for past investment experiences (past quality-upgrade and past FDI) as state 
characteristics because the probability of upgrading quality is relatively low in a year 
following FDI and, similarly, the probability of participating FDI is relatively low 
in a similar length of time following quality-upgrade experience as shown in Figure 
1.1. Thus , I use these lagged investment variables to examine whether or not the two 
investment decisions have inter-temporal substitution effects. 
I assume that markets are segmented. To maximize the present discounted value of 
their expected stream of payoff-profits , firms can decide on their investment choices 
based on their current state characteristics. To estimate the model, my approach 
builds on a line of research , initiated by Hotz and Miller (1993) and Hotz, Miller , 
Sanders and Smith (1994), on the study of a single agent dynamic optimization prob-
lem using a two-step approach. I employ a refinement of this two-step algorithm of 
estimating dynamic decisions suggested by Bajari, Benkard and Levin (2007) in order 
to handle both discrete and continuous investment decisions. I also incorporate the 
technique that finds the optimal quality-upgrade as the continuous choice variable by 
introducing the first order condition proposed by Stahl (20ll). In the first step, I 
1See Berry, Levinsohn and Pakes (1999) 
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recover marginal cost parameters from demand and supply estimations to estimate a 
market profit equation as a function of observed state characteristics. I also estimate 
several state transition equations and two investment policy equations as a function 
of these observed state characteristics. In the second step, I use a method of mo-
ments estimator by matching the model predictions to their empirical counterparts 
observed in the data to estimate dynamic cost parameters. In doing so, I am able to 
substantially reduce simulation bias in dynamic parameter estimates, particularly in 
small samples, such as the one considered in this chapter. 
My empirical results are summarized as follows. First, past quality-upgrade deci-
sion to attain higher relative quality in the current period and past FDI activity to 
spur more U.S. car sales in the current period increase current market profits. How-
ever, the export surplus has a negative impact on the market profits , which implies 
that firms are penalized and subjected to immediate reduction of their market profits 
if they fail to meet the VER quotas . Second, VERs encourage both quality-upgrade 
and FDI activities for Japanese firms , and the U.S. dollar depreciation makes FDI 
more profitable. Third, higher relative quality discourages quality-upgrade decision 
but encourages an FDI one. This suggests that firms switch their investment strat-
egy to capacity expansion as long as they have products of sufficiently high quality 
to attract consumers . Fourth, past FDI experience has a negative impact on the 
current quality-upgrade decision and similarly, past quality-upgrade activity has a 
negative impact on the current FDI choice, which supports the occurrence of dy-
namic substitutions in investment decisions. Lastly, there are significant sunk costs 
for both quality-upgrade and FDI activity, which supports inter-temporal linkages in 
decisions, and further the entry cost of FDI is larger than the fixed adjustment cost 
of quality-upgrade. To be more specific, the result indicates that a unit increase in 
quality level would cost about $1.9 billion and Japanese firms would spend about $4.8 
6 
billion for a production plant if they enter into the U.S to open the plant. 
This chapter also simulates three counterfactuals based on t he estimation of the 
structural model. The first simulation predicts t hat the overall quality-upgrade level 
and probability of undertaking FDI decrease without t he VERs. However, firms 
still invest in quality-upgrade and participate in FDI even when the VERs are not 
present. Interestingly, in the absence of the VERs, the probability of FDI dramatically 
decreases almost to zero when I control for the Japan/U.S. foreign exchange rates. 
This suggests that other factors, such as trade costs or entry costs, are also important 
in driving FDI decisions. The next two simulations examine the substitution effect 
between the two investment activities. The proposal to restrict the FDI policy causes 
a large increase in the level of quality-upgrade. Similarly, the proposal to restrict 
the quality-upgrade policy causes an increase in the probability of FDI, but one of a 
smaller magnitude in the sense that entry costs of undertaking FDI are more expensive 
than fixed adjustment costs of quality-upgrade. These results confirm that the two 
investment decisions are substitutes under the VERs in the sense that the alternative 
investment strategy may be the only way to overcome the trade restriction when one 
strategy is restricted. 
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows: Section 1.2 describes the relat ed 
literature; Section 1.3 describes the background of voluntary export restraints in the 
U.S. automobile industry; Section 1.4 describes the dynamic structural model of a 
single agent decision; Section 1.5 describes the data and specifications; Section 1.6 
explains the estimation strategy in detail; Section 1. 7 discusses t he results and Section 
1.8 describes the counterfactual experiments. Section 1.9 concludes the chapter. 
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1.2 Literature Review 
There is a large body of empirical studies that provide insights into the effects 
of trade policy by linking micro-level studies. Tybout (1992) analyzes policy effects 
by connecting changes in trade regimes to intra-sectoral responses of productivity. 
Because the manufacturing sector 's response is heterogeneous to changes in trade 
regimes, firm-level or plant-level productivity may often be miscalculated and , more-
over, may not accurately reflect important aspects of the sector 's response according 
to these changes. To explain the unpredictable responses of trade flows to changes 
in trade regime, Roberts and Tybout (1997) stress the fact that producers face sunk 
entry costs when entering into foreign markets. This implies that the changes in trade 
regime may induce entry into the export market if the expected future stream of oper-
ating profits covers the sunk costs of entering foreign markets. The fact that FDI also 
incurs a sunk entry cost as exports and firms are more likely to choose foreign direct 
investment (FDI) over exports if there are higher transportation costs of exports and 
trade barriers suggests that the existence of FDI entry cost is also an important factor 
to explain the responses of trade flows to changes in trade regime. As far as I know, 
this chapter is the first chapter to structurally estimate a sunk entry cost of FDI. 2 
Several authors are particularly interested in examining how VER affects changes 
in product prices or country welfare in the U.S. automobile industry. Dinopoulos 
and Kreinin (1988) examine the spillover effect on the demand for non-restricted 
producers, such as European automakers, using a simple reduced form model. They 
conclude that the VERs generate price increases of European cars after adjusting for 
quality-upgrade. Feenstra (1988) finds substantial quality-upgrade of Japanese cars 
2Many previous empirical literature has been structurally estimating sunk costs of quality-upgrade 
in terms of R&D. See Goettler, R . and B. Gordon (2009), Amiti, M. and A. K. Khandelwal (2010) 
and Aw, B., M. Roberts and Daniel Y. Xu (2011). 
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under VERs, and then, using a hedonic regression model, explains that some of the 
observed price increases in Japanese vehicles could be accounted for by corresponding 
quality improvement. More sophisticated empirical studies of the effect of VERs on 
the U.S. economy are Goldberg (1995) and Berry, Levinsohn and Pakes (1999). Using 
both consumer-level data and product-level data from Consumer Expenditure Survey 
(CES) , Goldberg estimates the structural parameters of the U.S. automobile industry 
in a static framework, and evaluates the welfare impact of different trade policies. 
She finds that the VERs were binding in 1983 and 1984, but had less of an effect in 
subsequent years . Berry, Levinsohn and Pakes also estimate a structural oligopoly 
model of the U.S. automobile industry, and then investigate t he effect of VERs on 
U.S. economic welfare. Although Berry et al's method is similar to that of Goldberg, 
their work differs in accounting for econometric price endogeneity and by using a 
different demand structure. However , both studies use quality-upgrade as a source of 
exogeneity so neither one models quality-upgrade as response for trade policy.3 
VERs in the automobile industry is an interesting topic that is equally important 
for both economists and policy makers and , as such, is the subject of many research 
studies , as discussed above. There is relatively little empirical work however, on the 
effect of VERs on FDI activities. An exception is the work of Co (1997) , who ex-
amines the FDI decision of Japanese automobile producers during the VERs period 
and finds how trade barriers combined with other government regulations and source 
of Japanese competitive advantages lead to FDI decisions. Co does not take dy-
namics into consideration , however, which may lead to underestimating the effect of 
trade restriction on FDI activities . Ignoring the dynamic issue also prevents us from 
understanding inter-temporal linkages between quality-upgrade and FDI decisions. 
3Berry, Levinsohn and Pakes (1999) explain t hat including FDI do not subst antively change their 
results in a static oligopoly structural model. I believe that this is due to the fact that their model 
is static. 
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1.3 Background: Voluntary Export Restraints In the U.S. 
Automobile Industry 
The U.S . automobile industry began in the 1890s and rapidly grew into the largest 
automotive industry in the world. This industry started with hundreds of automakers, 
but became dominated by three big producers: General Motors, Ford and Chrysler. 
Of particular relevance here, the U.S. automobile industry was primarily isolated from 
foreign competition because of the horizontal specification of the automobile products. 
The U.S. consumers preferred full sized vehicles produced by domestic automakers 
because gasoline prices were relatively cheap and they often needed to drive long 
distances. Thus , the dominance of the domestic firms in the U.S. automobile industry 
along with t he absence of competition with foreign automakers was enough to provide 
strong market power and high profits for the big three domestic producers .4 However, 
their dominant market power in the U.S. auto industry eventually led to several 
problems regarding price decisions and product strategy. They often joined forces to 
rig an increase in the automobile prices and thought about how to effectively block 
foreign entries. They often responded to the entries of foreign automakers into the 
U.S. market with auto price decreases, and then gradually raised their prices to more 
than pre-entry levels after foreign producers' exits. In terms of product strategy, 
they put more importance on updating the body designs of cars than on improving 
product quality performance, which ultimately harmed consumer welfare by reducing 
the average period of owning a car and increasing the frequency of car replacement. 
In t he 1970s and 1980s, the structure of the U.S. automobile industry, however, 
was dramatically transformed by the oil crisis, combined with government regulations. 
4 0no(1993) explains that GM, Ford and Chrysler earned an average rate of return on net worth 
of 19.7%, 12.3% and 10.7% respectively, compared to all manufacturing average of 9.2% during the 
period between 1946 and 1973. 
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Expensive gasoline prices were responsible for consumers ' switching their relative de-
mands for automobiles from low fuel efficiency domestic cars to higher fuel efficiency 
Japanese cars, which led to increasing market shares of Japanese producers. Further-
more, safety and environmental issues required stricter regulations of automobiles, 
such as mandated shoulder belts for the front passenger, energy-absorbing steering 
columns and padded interiors. In response to these needs, the domestic producers im-
mediately introduced new compact automobiles designed to follow these regulations. 
However , there were several serious manufacturing problems which ultimately led to 
the producers' losing market shares. 5 Under the highly competitive pressure from for-
eign automakers, especially from Japanese producers, Chrysler slid into bankruptcy 
and the domestic auto producers petitioned the government for relief from imports. 
The U.S . government responded immediately by granting emergency loans to Chrysler 
and by negotiating bilateral voluntary export restraints (VERs) with the Japanese 
government. 
In 1981 , Japanese producers entered into a voluntary restraint agreement, which 
imposed on exports a limit of 1.68 million units per year. The VERs were renewed 
regularly and lasted until the early 1990s.6 Each Japanese producer was assigned 
a separate sub-quota, allegedly based on their past sales of automobiles in the U.S . 
market. In addition, the U.S. government started to purposely depreciate the U.S. 
dollar against foreign currency, including the Japanese yen, in early 1985. These com-
bined policies eventually resulted in two primary investment strategies by Japanese 
automakers . First, the Japanese auto producers switched their emphasis to adopt 
new technology and export higher quality automobiles, which gave them higher profit 
5The U.S. big t hree producers suffered from massive recalls and poor quality after introducing 
several compact automobiles. For example, Ford Pinto as the new compact car was found that it did 
not design any safeguards and its gas tank was very vulnerable to exploding when hit from behind. 
6The export limits was raised to 1.85 million autos in 1984 and to 2.30 million autos in 1985, 
until the program was terminated in the early 1990s. 
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margms. More specifically, they started adopting new engines and exporting better 
performing autos with stronger engine powers. In addition, three big Japanese au-
tomakers, Honda, Toyota and Nissan, began to launch luxury brand divisions in the 
second half of the VER period by developing new engine technology and by upgrading 
car designs. In 1986, after several years of research, Honda opened its Acura auto-
mobile division in the U.S. It was the first Japanese premium brand to be introduced 
and its success led to luxury brand ventures by other Japanese producers. In 1989, 
Toyota and Nissan began to launch their own premium brands, Lexus and Infiniti, 
respectively, in the U.S. Second, Japanese producers began to invest in building auto 
production plants in the U.S . in terms of FDI because J apanese vehicles made in the 
U.S. were excluded from export limits. As a leader, Honda opened a new production 
plant in Marysville Ohio in 1982, encouraging the entry of Toyota and Nissan into the 
U.S. by 1985. By 1990, other J apanese automakers, such as Mazda, Mitsubishi and 
Subaru, joined in producing a substantial number of automobiles in the U.S. 7 Their 
consolidation of investment strategies, combined with their "Just In Time" (JIT) sys-
tem, completely succeeded in overcoming the VER limits. The JIT is a production 
and inventory control system in which materials are purchased and automobiles are 
produced only as needed to meet actual consumer demand. This process is very effi-
cient for the automobile industry because it can reduce inventories to the minimum 
level and, in some cases, to zero. Ultimately, this great success caused the U.S. do-
mestic producers to develop joint ventures with several J apanese automakers. More 
importantly, Japanese producers have become the largest foreign presence in the U.S. 
through an ongoing global expansion. 
7 Honda production plants: Marysville in 1982 and East Liberty OH, in 1990. Toyota production 
plants: Fremont CA, in 1985 and Georgetown, KY in 1988. Nissan production plants: Smyrna TN, 
in 1985. Mazda production plants: Flat Rock MI, in 1987. Mitsubishi production plants: Normal 
IL , in 1988. Subaru production plants: Lafayette IN, in 1989. 
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1.4 Model 
I construct a model that captures the investment behavior of Japanese firms in the 
U.S. automobile industry in order to examine the effects ofvoluntar/~xport restraints 
(VER.s) , combined with other state characteristics, on two types of investment deci-
sions . The model focuses on exporting firms' investment decisions regarding quality 
investment (quality-upgrade) and capacity investment (FDI) in the context where 
such firms are facing various state characteristics. In each period, a firm chooses its 
quality-upgrade level to increase its product quality for the next period. The firm 
also decides each period whether or not to open a new production plant to expand its 
capacity level the next period. Each firm's market profit and these two investment 
policies are a function of its own state characteristics that are currently observed. 
Both quality-upgrade and FDI activities involve substantial adjustment costs and 
entry costs respectively, so the current period's investment decisions affect future in-
vestment decisions as well as future market profits. The firm chooses its two types 
of investments to maximize the present discounted value of its expected stream of 
payoff-profits as a function of its own states. I assume that markets are segmented 
so the firm maximizes the expected intertemporal payoff-profits earned from the U.S. 
automobile market. 
1.4.1 State Characteristics 
At period t, firm f's state characteristics can be described by the vector of S'j~arB: 
For each firm in each period, I construct various state characteristics that are 
8The vector of state characteristics is a part of the state vector. The state vector is described in 
Section 1.4.4. 
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likely to affect all payoff-relevant features, such as market profit , quality investment 
and capacity investment decisions. 
All firms can observe the same exogenous states VERt and EX Ct. I call them 
exogenous aggregate state variables because they are not controlled by firms but de-
terrnined exogenously in the world. The variable VERt is a dummy variable denoted 
as below: 





The variable EXCt is defined as the logarit hm value of the U.S. dollar in terms 
of Japanese yen (JPY¥/US$) determined in t he foreign exchange market . 
Firm f can observe firm-specific endogenous states LF Dlft, LQU P1t, QU AL1t 
and DI F Fft· I call t hem endogenous state variables because each firm can adjust 
these state variables by choosing quality investment and/or capacity investment . So 
I add the subscript f in t hem to identify each firm. The variable LF DI ft is a binary 





if capacity investment occurred in period t - 1 
otherwise 





if quality investment occurred in period t - 1 
otherwise 
I include these lagged investment variables as state variables because the current 
quality-upgrade decision is likely to be negatively affected by the last period 's FDI 
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experience and similarly the current FDI decision is likely to be negatively affected 
by the last period's quality-upgrade in the data (Figure 1.1) . So I want to capture 
the dynamic substitution effect in two investment decisions by including these state 
variables, LF DI ft and LQU Pft· The variable QU ALft represents the firm f's relative 
quality level compared to the average quality level available among other firms. The 
value of QU ALft below one corresponds to a case that the firm f produces relatively 
low quality products among others, while the value of QU AL1t above one indicates 
that the firm f produces relatively high quality products among others. The variable 
DI F Fft captures a shortage or a surplus between exports and trade limits implying 
that the positive value of D IF Fft corresponds to a case that the firm f's exports 
exceed the trade limits, while the negative value of D IF Fft indicates that the firm 
f's exports are below the the trade limits. 
1.4.2 Timing of Decisions 
Each decision period is one year. In each period, the sequence of events unfolds 
as follows: 
• Firms observe states S1t and decide on product prices9 ; 
• Consumers decide which product to buy based on product characteristics and 
prices. Firms accrue market profits from product sales; 
• Firms receive private draws on the cost of quality investment c:}t and observe 
a fixed adjustment cost of quality-upgrade, and make their continuous decision 
to upgrade quality level. 
9 The details of the demand model are described in Appendix 1. 
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• Firms receive private draws on the cost of capacity investment Eft and observe 
a sunk entry cost of FDI, and make their discrete decision to participate in FDI. 
• Observed states Stt are updated for the following period according to the state 
transitions described below. 
1.4.3 Quality and Capacity Investment Costs 
Let time be assumed discrete with an infinite horizon and indexed by t E 1, 2, · · · , oo. 
At the beginning of period t, firm f decides to choose quality investment level to 
increase its product quality. This decision can be summarized by quality-upgrade 
variable 6q1t, which is defined as the increase on median quality level of available 
products produced by the firm f in period t (i.e., 6qft = qft - qft- 1 ). The adjust-
ment cost for upgrading quality in period t is assumed to be proportional to upgrade 
quality level as follows: 
cq (Schar t· cq (]"(j 8 '11(j) = (cq + E(j ) 6q (Schar t· 8 '11(j) jt l l l l l 'I j jt jt l l l 'I j (1.1) 
where 6q (-) is a reduced-form function of a state characteristics vector S'j7ar and 
a time trend t, parameterized by a vector of quality investment decision coeffi-
cients c5 and ryJ is a firm specific quality investment constant (a firm fixed effect), 
described in Section 1.6. The variable c}t is a shock to quality investment cost 
distributed N (0, 0"0 ) . This shock will capture the difference between the observed 
quality-upgrade level and the optimal quality-upgrade level predicted by the model, 
explained in Section 1.6.2.2. 
At the beginning of each period, the firm f also decides whether or not to open a 
new production plant in the foreign country through FDI. The firm's entry cost for 
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FDI in period t is assumed to depend on the firm's FDI entry choice X!t as follows: 
cc (Schar t" Cc (J 'Y rv 7J "~ ) = (cc + E 'Y ) X (Schar t· rv 7J"~) ft 1 1 1 1 I 1 f ft ft ' ' I l f (1.2) 
where x ( ·) is a reduced-form function of a state characteristics vector S'j7ar and a 
time-trend t , parameterized by a vector of capacity investment decision coefficients 1 
and 7J J is a firm specific capacity investment constant (a firm fixed effect), described 
in Section 1.6. The variable c ft is a shock to capacity investment cost distributed 
Finally the firm f's static payoff-profit at period t is defined as follows: 
(Schar t· e) - II (Schar t· II) - cq (Schar t · q ~ s: 0) - c c (schar t· c -y ~ ,. ) 1T ft ' ' - . . ft ' ' a, 1)f ft , ' c , CJ , u, 1Jt ft , , c , CJ , y, 1Jt 
(1.3) 
where e = { cq, CY0 , cc , CY"~, a, 6, "(, rJj , 7JJ, rJJ}. The firm's market profit II (-) is a 
reduced-form function of state characteristics S'j7ar and a time trend t , parameterized 
by a vector of market profit coefficients a and rJj is a firm specific market profit 
constant (a firm fixed effect) described in Section 1.6. 
1.4.4 States Space and Dynamic Programming 
Firm f's states in period t can be fully described by a state vector Sf( 
s - { schar n q c t} ft - ft ' 7Jt ' 7Jj , 7Jf , 
where 7JJ , 17 j, 1(} are firm f's fixed-effects and t is the time trend explained in 
Section 1.6.1. 
Firm f's payoff-profit over possible sequences of states can be represented by 
payoff-profit functions "E.':=o fF 1T (a ft+n S ft+r), where f3 E (0, 1) is a discount factor 
and 1r (aft , Sft) is t he payoff-profit function in period t . The firm f' s quality and 
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capacity investment decisions in period t affect transitions of state variables but the 
firm faces uncertainty about the future values of state variables . Its beliefs about 
these future states can be represented by a Markov transition distribution function 
P (SJt+l J aft, SJt)· The beliefs are rational because they are based on the true tran-
sition probabilities of state variables from the data. At period t , the firm f chooses 
investment decisions denoted by CJ f to maximize the present discounted value of its 
expected stream of payoff-profits: 
(1.4) 
This is an agent's dynamic programming problem. The firm 's strategy maps from 
its state vector in period t to a vector of actions in period t + 1: 
(1.5) 
In the context of the present model, CJ (SJt) is a set of policy functions which 
describes the firm 's investment behavior for quality-upgrade and capacity expansion 
as a function of the present state vector. Let V (SJt ,E}t,E}t) be the value function 
associated with this problem. By Bellman's principle of optimality the value function 
can be obtained as follows: 
v ( Sjt ,E}t, Eft ) 
= maxa1 ( 1l' (aft , Sft) + {3 I IV ( Sft+I , E~t+l> c }t+l) dP (Sft+l I aft, Sft) dF (c~t+l) dU ( c }t+l)) 
(1.6) 
The optimal strategy CJj that maximizes the value of states S;t is defined as follows: 
(1.7) 
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choice-specific value function . 
1.5 Data and Specifications 
I collected data from the U.S . automobile industry annually from 1977 to 1996. I 
used product-level data on prices, quantities and quality levels to estimate the demand 
equation for the U.S. automobile market. Ward's Automotive group collects product-
level data for all the automakers including foreign producers in the U.S. automobile 
industry and provides the annual results in Ward's Automotive Yearbook. In this 
Yearbook, each product's list price , quantity and specific engineering attributes, such 
as horsepower and weight , that are available in the U.S. automobile market can be 
found. Each product quality level is measured by the ratio of the product's horse 
power value to product's weight. 10 
I examine the effects of voluntary export restraints (VERs), combined with other 
state characteristics, on two types of investment decisions of J apanese firms: quality-
upgrade and foreign direct investment (FDI). I also investigate inter-temporal sub-
stitutions between these two options. I separately collect Japanese product data on 
prices, quantities, horsepower and weights. The Japanese automotive firms studied 
in t his chapter are Honda, Toyota, Nissan, Mazda, Mitsubishi, Subaru and Isuzu. 
Because each product has numerous variants with different equipments and specifica-
tions I use the base model for each nameplate , which makes the number of products 
computationally manageableY I also calculate the sum of non-Japanese product 
10HP /Weight is in 100·s of HP divided by 1,000·s of lbs. The ratio of horse power value to weight 
captures firm's quality level well in the sense that years of quality-upgrade are consistent with years 
of launching firm's luxury divisions . 
11 For example, Honda Acura Integra Type-R is lighter (2600 lbs.) and less powerful (195 HP) 
than Honda Acura NSX (3069 lbs., 290HP) based on 1997 year model although they are under the 
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quantities in order to compute the outside product option and total market size of 
the U.S. auto market. 
Firm-level data on exports, sub-quotas of the VERs, years of entry into the U.S. 
for production plants , quality levels to estimate the market profit function, two invest-
ment policy functions and state transition functions for Japanese firms are necessary 
for this analysis. I use each firm's total quantities sold in the U.S . automobile mar-
ket in period t as the firm's total exports to the U.S . in the same period. This is 
probably an imperfect measure of t he firm 's annual exports because automobiles can 
be inventoried and there is, in fact, a reported large inventory of Japanese cars in 
stock in 1981 (Berry, Levinsohn and Pakes 1999). However it is roughly consistent 
with the idea that the inventory of cars is likely to be small because most automobile 
firms produce slightly different models under the same nameplate every year, such as 
the 2011 Honda Civic being followed by the 2012 Honda Civic. More importantly, 
Japanese producers developed the "Just-In-Time" (JIT) manufacturing system in the 
early 1980s, which was extremely proficient in reducing auto inventories. The JIT sys-
tem is a production and inventory control system in which materials are purchased 
and automobiles are produced only as needed to meet actual consumer demand. In 
so doing, inventories are reduced to the minimum and, in some cases, are zero. Ac-
cordingly, I treat the firm 's total quantities sold in the U.S. as the firm 's total exports 
to the U.S. in each period does not distort much my results. For each Japanese firm, 
I am able to observe a separate sub-quota of the VERs and years of its entry into 
the U.S. to open a production plant from Ward's Automotive Yearbook. I identify 
years of FDI based on each firm 's reported dates of started production as binary 
0/1 variables. Each firm's quality level is measured by the median quality level of 
all available products in the firm. While the mean quality level can move from year 
same nameplate Acura. 
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to year even though firms do not invest in quality-upgrade, the median value of all 
available products in the firm is likely to move relatively litt le. 
To express prices into real terms, I make use of consumer price deflators. All 
prices are adjusted to 1983 constant dollars. I also collected data on Japan/U.S. 
foreign exchange rate to use as a state variable because it is likely to affect investment 
decisions , especially for FDI activit ies . The consumer price deflators and Japan / U.S. 
foreign exchange rates were obtained from Bureau of Labor Statistics. 12 
A look at the data confirms that J apanese automobile producers made significant 
quality-upgrades and started to enter into the U.S . to build production plants over 
the VER period. For the purpose of looking at investment incentives of the VERs, 
I examine their investment behavior over the sample period 1977-1996 by including 
both the VER (1981-1991) and non-VER period (1977-1980 and 1992-1996). A look 
at the magnitude of quality-upgrade and the frequency of FDI by Japanese firms per 
year over the sample period suggests that J apanese firms responded to the changing 
trade policy by exporting higher quality cars with better engine performance and by 
establishing production plants in the U.S. to produce mass market vehicles. 
Figure 1.1 shows the quality-upgrade levels and years of FDI entry into the U.S. 
by Japanese firms on a yearly basis from 1977 to 1996 by including both the VER and 
non-VER periods. The quality-upgrade level is measured by the difference between a 
firm 's quality level in the current period and the firm's quality level in the previous 
period. Each firm 's quality level is measured by the median quality level of all available 
products in the firm. I denote 1 if Japanese firms entered into the U.S . to build a 
production plant and 0 otherwise for the years of FDI entry. Since J apanese cars 
produced in the U.S . are excluded from VER limits, most J apanese firms began to 
participate in FDI during the period of VERs. Beginning wit h Honda's Marysville 
12http: / jwww.bls.gov /data/ 
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plant in 1982, Japanese firms responded to VERs by opening U.S. production plants. 
By 1990, Nissan, Toyota, Mazda, and Mitsubishi had joined in producing substantial 
numbers of cars in the U.S . through FDI. The quality-upgrade levels also picked 
up dramatically over the VER period for most J apanese producers. Interestingly, I 
find that these two possible investment decisions were likely to be substitutes. For 
instance, the probability of upgrading quality is relatively low in a year following FDI 
and, similarly, the probability of entering into the U.S. to establish production plants 
is relatively low in a similar length of time following quality-upgrade experience. 
Before the VERs were in effect, none of the Japanese firms had U.S. production 
plants. After the VERs were in place, they contributed greatly to FDI decisions of 
Japanese producers with some exceptions, such as Isuzu and Suzuki, whose number 
of exports were relatively small compared to their export limits. Figure 1.2 describes 
the difference between exports and trade limits. I exclude the non-VER period from 
Figure 1.2 because Japanese firms could export without any constraints when the 
VERs were not present. As shown in Figure 1.2, exports to the U.S. exceeded export 
limits for most Japanese firms in the beginning of the VER period, while exports 
from Isuzu and Suzuki to the U.S. fell under their quota limits. This suggests that 
Isuzu and Suzuki did not have any incentives to participate in FDI. 
Although export restraints greatly contributed to entries of Japanese firms into 
the U.S. to open production plants, it cannot fully explain their strategic investment 
activities. For instance, as leading Japanese producers, Honda and Toyota experi-
enced more than one FDI: once in the early 1980s and another time in the late 1980s. 
Moreover, other firms tended to enter into the U.S. in the second half of the VER 
period. This was not a coincidence. In early 1985, the U.S. government purposely 
started to depreciate the U.S. dollar against foreign currency, including the Japanese 
yen. So I expect that the decreasing Japan/U.S. foreign exchange rates (U.S. dollar 
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depreciation) fills the gap that is unexplained by the VERs. As shown in Figure 1.3, 
the U.S. dollar value against the Japanese yen depreciated dramatically in the middle 
of the 1980s (1985 and 1986), then gradually declined over the rest of sample period. 
This depreciation pattern suggests that Japanese firms might find profitable to do 
FDI in the U.S. , especially after 1985. 
With respect to quality-upgrades, the vast majority of quality-upgrade decisions 
occurred during the VER period (Figure 1.1). This suggests that Japanese producers 
began to switch a large majority of exports to higher quality vehicles when they faced 
limits on the number of cars exported because exporting higher quality products is 
more profitable than exporting lower or middle quality cars. Moreover, activities in 
quality-upgrade are observed more frequently than FDI experiences, which implies 
that the fixed adjustment cost of quality-upgrade is probably lower than the entry 
cost of FDI. However, the VERs cannot fully explain these quality-upgrade decisions 
of all Japanese producers. For instance , Suzuki and Mitsubishi were likely to increase 
their quality levels gradually over the sample period regardless of the VERs. To 
explain this investment pattern of quality-upgrade, I use the time trend dummy in 
estimation. 
The goal of this chapter is to examine the dynamic investment decisions of Japanese 
firms in quality-upgrade and FDI depending on the current state characteristics. I 
model each firm as solving an independent individual problem in a reduced form, 
taking the choices of competitors as exogenous. Strategic interactions in investment 
choices is potentially interesting but not the focus of the chapter. 
I also take advantage of various state characteristics that may affect investment 
decisions of Japanese firms in order to estimate investment policy equations as a 
function of these state variables. For the state variables , I include VER states as 
binary 0/ 1 variables, lagged FDI choice and lagged quality-upgrade choice as binary 
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0/ 1 variables. I also add real J apan/U.S. foreign exchange rates, relative quality 
levels and differences between exports and quotas. Each firm 's relative quality level 
is measured by a ratio of a firm 's quality level over t he average quality level of other 
Japanese firms . Each firm's difference is defined as the difference between the firm 's 
total exports to the U.S . and its sub-quotas, interacting with the VER binary variables 
(VERt · (Exportft - Quotaft)). This interaction captures the fact that there is no 
shortage or surplus of exports without the VERs. I also use time trend variables and 
firm-specific fixed effects to capture each firm 's heterogeneous characteristics . 
In sum, the data required for the estimation of the model consist of t he following 
variables: 1) product-level data - prices, units sold, quality levels , product market 
shares and market sizes; 2) firm-level data- relative quality levels, differences between 
exports and VER limits, quality-upgrade levels, years of FDI entry and firm market 
shares; and 3) macro-level data - consumer price deflators and Japan/ U.S. foreign 
exchange rates. The prices, units sold, quality levels, product market shares and 
market size are observed in the product-level data. Each product market share is 
defined as the ratio of units sold to the market size. I define the annual market size 
by adding all number of vehicles being sold on a yearly basis in the U.S. automobile 
market. The relative quality levels, differences between exports and limits, quality-
upgrade levels, years of FDI entry and firm market shares are obtained in t he firm-
level data for the dynamic model estimation associated with quality and capacity 
investment cost parameters. 
Table 1.1 provides the summary statistics for all variables t hat I include in the 
estimation. As shown in Table 1.1 , there is considerable homogeneity among Japanese 
firms, which allows me to look at their investment behavior in a single agent decision 
modeL The variable which shows the greatest variation relative to its mean is t he 
frequency of capacity investment (FDI). This suggests that the FDI decisions heavily 
24 
depend on each firm's specific characteristics or each firm's specific environmental 
situations. For example, Toyota participated in FDI twice over the sample period 
because it was facing serious exports restraints whereas Isuzu never entered into the 
U.S . to open production plants because as written, this suggests that there were 
many quotas, not that it was not a problem limiting exports to the quota amount. 
The median value of relative quality levels is at 103 % of the leading Japanese firms 
in terms of quality indicating that Japanese firms are on nearly the same quality 
level. This supports the fact that Japanese firms consolidated their technologies and 
strategic investment behavior to successfully overcome the unfavorable trade regime. 
1.6 Estimation 
1.6.1 First Step Estimation 
1.6.1.1 Market Profit Estimation 
I estimate the market profit equation as a function of state variables. The depen-
dent variable is the total market profit generated by firm fin period t. The regressors 
are the state variables that were discussed in Section 1.4.1. I include a time trend to 
see whether the market profit is largely the result of growth in production or industry 
earnings. Firm fixed-effects are also included. Thus the firm f's market profit in 
period t is as follows: 
II (Schar t· a rli) = ac + rrr (Schar . as) + att + 'Ylrr + WQ (1.8) jt l l l 'If jt l 'If jt 
where rrr (-) is a reduced-form function of the state characteristics vector Sj~ar , pa-
rameterized by the vector of market profit coefficients as and t is the time trend, TJ7 is 
the firm f's fixed-effect , and w'ft is a shock to the market profit distributed N (0, K:0 ). 
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The standard error of the market profit shock "'a is estimated by the standard error of 
the regression residual across all observations. The details of the demand estimation 
and computation of the market profit are described in Appendix 113 
1.6.1.2 Quality and Capacity Investment Estimation 
The investment policy functions are optimal because they are all based on the 
actual investment policies that are actually played in the data. I estimate a reduced 
form for quality investment policy using a non-linear regression. The dependent 
variable is the quality-upgrade level generated by firm f in period t. The regressors 
are the state variables. I add the time trend to capture the fact that the data shows 
that quality-upgrade activity gradually increased for some Japanese firms even when 
voluntary export restraints (VERs) were not present. Firm fixed-effects are also 
included to account for firm-specific characteristics for the quality investment. For 
the dependent variable of quality investment, I consider the fact that a firm cannot 
downgrade its upgraded quality level once it achieves that level. Therefore I define 
the quality-upgrade level as follows: 
D.q (Schar t· cq IIo (j 1]o) = max { 0 (be + rq (Schar. bs) + btt + TJq + wo ) } ft ' ' ' ' ' f ' jt ' f ft (1.9) 
where rq (-) is a reduced-form function of the state characteristics vector Sj~ar, pa-
rameterized by the vector of quality investment coefficients 65 and t is the time trend, 
'f)J· represents the firm f's fixed-effect and wJt captures a shock to quality investment 
distributed N (0, "'8) . The standard error of the quality investment shock "'8 is esti-
mated by the standard error of the regression residual across all observations. 
13The market profits of firms are computed from prices and marginal costs of products. Since I 
cannot observe the product marginal costs from the data I need to recover them by using a simple 
logit demand estimation. 
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In this chapter, the capacity investment is associated with a discrete choice. I 
therefore estimate the capacity investment policy function XJt using a probit model 
with state variables as regressors: 
{
1, 
char . c 'Y "f _ x(S1t , t, c, a-,,, TJ1)-
0, otherwise 
(1.10) 
where rc ( ·) is a reduced-form function of the state characteristics vector S'j~ar, param-
eterized by the vector of capacity investment coefficients 1 5 and t is the time trend, 
TJ'j represents the firm f's fixed effect and w]t captures a shock to capacity investment 
distributed N (0 , K:"~). 14 The standard error of the capacity investment shock K:"~ is 
estimated as the standard error of the regression residual across all observations. 
1.6.1.3 State Transitions Estimation 
To complete the first step estimation, it is necessary to specify t he causal effect 
of the current period 's st ate variables on the next period's state variables. The state 
transition functions are rational because they are all based on the true transition 
probabilities of state variables that are actually played in the data. 
The lagged FDI variable, LF DI ft and t he lagged quality-upgrade variable LQU P ft 
are deterministic funct ions of last period 's choices, so no estimation of t hese transi-
tions is necessary. Future beliefs about LF DI ft+ l are therefore always equal to the 
current period 's FDI decision as shown in t he following equation: 
LF DI ft+l = XJt (1.11) 
Future beliefs about LQU P ft+l is also equal to the current period's quality-
14 After model estimation, I exclude the finn fixed effect to avoid the incidental parameter problem. 
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if 6qft > 0 
otherwise 
I take these binary lagged investment decision states into account for t he state 
variables in the sense that the current quality-upgrade decision is likely to be affected 
by t he past FDI experience and, similarly, the current FDI decision is likely to be 
affected by the past quality-upgrade experience observed in the data (Figure 1.1). 
More notably, I use only one lag for each variable because Japanese producers tern-
porarily stopped upgrading quality levels and stopped entering into the U.S. to build 
production plants for about a year following FDI and quality-upgrades respectively.15 
I assume that the binary VER variable V ERt+ 1 indicates 1 if the VER occurs in 
the current period and 0 otherwise as follows: 
{ 
1, if VERt= 1 
VERt+i = , i = 1,··· ,oo 
0, otherwise 
(1.13) 
This implies that Japanese producers believe that the VERs will be imposed for their 
entire lives if they observe the trade restriction in the first period. 
The Japan/U.S. foreign exchange rate EXCt+l is also assumed to follow a first-
order autoregressive process AR(1) as below: 
15The use of only one lag was determined after much experimentation by including more lagged 
variables. I found that the only one lagged investment variables give a much more significant result. 
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(1.14) 
where vfXC is a shock to the exchange rate distributed N (0 , a-EXC ). I simply use 
the OLS regression to estimate the state transit ion function of foreign exchange rates . 
The standard error of t he exchange rate shock a-EXC is estimated by the standard 
error of the regression residual across all observations. 
I assume that two endogenous state variables QU ALtt+l and DJ F Fft+l are always 
proportional to the current period's own state and the current period's two investment 
decisions in the following equations: 
QUAL _ "'QUAL+ ,~,QUALQUAL + "'QUAL A + "'QUAL + QUAL jt+l - 'f'O 'f' l ft '1"2 uqft '1"3 Xtt 1/ ft (1. 15) 
(1.16) 
where v~UAL and vJ;IFF are a shock distributed N (0 , a-QUAL) and N (0 , a-DIFF) re-
spectively. The standard error of each state shock a-QUAL and a-DIFF is estimated by 
t he standard error of the regression residual across all observations respectively. I es-
timate state transit ion functions for both quality investment and capacity investment 
using maximum likelihood estimation. 
1.6.2 Second Step Estimation 
The first step recovers all parameters that describe market profits at each state , 
how the state vector affects investment decisions in each period, and how the state 
characteristics evolve over time. The second step is concerned with finding cost pa-
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rameters that make both quality and capacity investment functions optimal. To 
recover these parameters, I use a method of moments estimator to minimize the dis-
tance between observed investments at each state and those predicted by the model 
suggested by Bajari, Benkard and Levin (2007) . In particular, I find the cost coeffi-
cients that satisfy the first order condition for the optimal quality investment level as 
a continuous choice as proposed by Stahl ( 2011). 
A firm incurs significant fixed adjustment costs and entry costs when it determines 
to choose quality investment and capacity investment respectively. More notably, the 
present period's capacity investment is likely to prevent the firm from embarking on 
the next period's quality investment and, similarly, the present period's quality in-
vestment is likely to prevent the firm from undertaking the next period 's capacity 
investment. In other words, its investment decisions today affect all future market 
profits as well as future investment decisions. Therefore, a firm chooses its investment 
decisions for quality investment and capacity investment so as to maximize its stream 
of payoff-profits, not just its static profits. I follow the forward simulation approach 
of Bajari, Benkard and Levin (2007) (hereafter BBL) to form both ex-ante partial 
derivatives of value function for the optimal quality investment decision ( continu-
ous choice) and value function for the optimal capacity investment decision (discrete 
choice). 
1.6.2.1 Quality Investment Cost 
Firm f can choose quality-upgrade level6qft to maximize the expected discounted 
value of payoff-profits in period t. The quality investment decision !iqft is viewed as a 
continuous choice so I use the first order condition for the optimal quality investment 
level. To avoid corner solutions I assume that the firm chooses positive quality-
upgrade level at each period16 : 
16I observe zero quality-upgrade levels in the data but I assume that the firm chooses only positive 
quality-upgrade levels to manage the first order condition in the modeL So the quality-upgrade shock 
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(1.17) 
where the discount factor (3 is set to 0.925 for the empirical analysis. The equation 
( 1.1 7) says that the marginal cost of the quality investment decision 6qft on the 
current profit must be equal to the marginal benefit of the quality investment decision 
6qft on the present discounted value of the firm's expected stream of payoff-profits . 
That is, the quality investment decision today 6qft affects the sequence of expected 
future payoff-profits because it affects expected future endogenous states, such as 
future relative quality levels and differences between exports and VER limits. Thus, 
I can write the first order condition as follows: 
(1.18) 
The effect of present quality investment decision on the future states works through 
the firm 's strategies. The next period 's states depend on the current investment 
decisions and on the current states. The future profit in period t + T is a function of 
the t + T period's states. So the first order condition can be transformed as follows: 
Recall from Section 1.6.1.3 that I specify linear state transition functions so 
8S'/8S and 8S'/86q are a vector of constants with respect to the current state 
S and the quality investment choice 6q. Therefore, the first order condition can be 
written as follows: 
E0 is able to capture the difference between observed quality-upgrade levels and the optimal quality-
upgrade levels predicted by the model. 
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q 6 T 1fjt+T () 
[ 
oo (a )' (aP) T-1 ~s' ] 
- c - CJt + Et ?; tl asft+T as DLo.q 1 s1t = o v f, t (1.20) 
where Pare state transition functions discussed in Section 1.6.2.4. The next step is to 
find, for each state Sft observed in the data, the expectation in the present discounted 
value of the stream offuture marginal payoff-profits Et (l:~=O f3T f)Jr ft+T/ aSft+T I SJt). 
The marginal effects of state variables on the payoff-profit (a1r/aS) is more compli-
cated because some state variables enter non-linearly into the payoff-profit. 17 So the 
marginal effects of state variables on the payoff-profit is defined as a function of the 
current state variables as long as those state variables enter into the market profit 
or two investment cost functions non-linearly and Et (2:~0 f3T a'lrft+T/aSft+T I SJt) 
is evaluated at Et ( S ft+T I S Jt) for each period t + T. 
The expectation in Et (l:~o f3T ( a7r jt+T /as ft+T )' I s ft) is over shocks to state 
transitions (v). Here, I use the assumption that the dynamic cost parameters that 
are unknown enter linearly into the market profits and into both quality and capacity 
investment cost functions in the current period and all future period as in BBL. In 
order to estimate expectation of the partial derivatives of the value function, I use 
the forward simulation approach suggested by BBL: 
17 To be more specific, I add the interaction term which is associated with the relative quality vari-
able derived from the past quality investment experience and the lagged capacity investment variable 
to capture the substitution effect of two investment decisions on the market profits. lVloreover, the 
market profit and two investment costs have a quadratic term of the difference variable and/or the 
relative quality variable interacted with the VER dummy in estimation. The use of quadratic and 
interaction terms was determined after much experimentation by including and excluding various 
quadratic and interaction variables of state characteristics. I found that these variables give a much 
more significant result . 
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0 - q 0 E [~ (3r (anft+r)' (rap)r-1 as' Is l 
- - c - Eft + t L - -- ft 
r=1 asft+r ' as aD.q 
[ 
oo ((aP ( = 1))' ) (ap)r-1 as' ] 
-CJ
1 Et ~ (3r r ax;;::r E1ft+r a~~ aD.q I Sjt v /, t (1.21) 
where: 
c}t+r rv CJ0 N (0, 1) ' Eh+r rv CJ1 N (0 , 1) and Eojt+r rv N (0, 1) ' Clft+r ""'N (0, 1) 
and <P ( ·) is the standard normal distribution. 
For the given st at e S1t, a simulated path of play can be obtained by using the 
partial derivatives of estimated market profit function , quality and capacity invest-
ment policy functions and a set of shocks drawn from the estimated distributions of 
endogenous state transition shocks. I simulate the evolution of each state variable 
based on the transition function with many periods (100) until the discount factor 
will contribute sufficiently small present value of marginal market profits and two 
investment policies. Given a set of coefficients on the market profit and investment 
costs , and draws of shocks, I can calculate t he present value of marginal payoff-profits 
associated with t his path of play. I repeat this step many times (1000) and compute 
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the present value of marginal payoff-profits over all of simulated paths of play which 
finally yields an estimated ex-ante stream of marginal payoff-profits given this state. 
1.6.2.2 Search for Quality Investment Cost Estimates 
In this section, I discuss the search for quality investment cost parameters that sets 
the average over all states of the divergence between observed quality investment and 
the optimal quality investment predicted by the model equal to zero. As explained 
above, for a given set of parameters of market profit and two investment costs, I can 
estimate the first order condition (1.21) applying the simulation method that BBL 
suggest to estimate the value function. Note that here I construct the difference 
between observed quality investment and optimal quality investment predicted by 
the model by substituting the actual quality investment observed in the data for 
6qft into the equation ( 1. 21). So actual quality investment cost shock c}t can fully 
account for the difference between observed quality investment and predicted optimal 
quality investment , which should be close to zero. I construct the first moment 
condition using the average over all states of the fi:rst order conditions evaluated at 
the observed quality investment. The first order condition at the observed quality 
investment 6q'j~served is as follows: 
6 = _ q + E [~ (3T (aiTft+T)' (ap)T·-l aS' IS !:::,. observed] Eft c t 0 as as a6 ft, qft 
T=l jt+T q 
_ qE [~(3T (a6qft+T) 1 (ap)T~l j}S' IS !:::,. observed] 
c t 0 as as ah. Jt, qft 
T=l jt+T q 
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-ccE [~ (Jr(aPr(Xft+r =l))'(ap)r-- 1 as' IS 6 observed] 
t 0 as !':} s !':}/\ ft , qft 
r=1 ft+r u uu.q 
_ "~E [~ (Jr ((aPr(Xft+r = 1))' ) (aP\~r- 1 ~IS 6 observed] Vj CJ t 0 aS S1ft+r !C:lS !C:l 1\ ft, qft ' t 
r=1 ft+r U ) uu.q 
(1.22) 
I then define the moment condition of quality investment as follows: 
G = _1 ~~ { - q + E [~ (3r (a1rft+r) 1 ~ISft+r IS 6 observed]} 1 rs 0 0 c t 0 as '16 ft , qft 
t=1 s=1 r=1 ft+r ( qft 
(1.23) 
1.6.2.3 Capacity Investment Cost 
Firm f can also determine whether or not it opens a new production plant Xft in 
period t to maximize the expected discounted value of payoff-profits. The capacity 
investment decision Xft is modeled as binary 0/ 1 choices. So I use the conditional 
logit model for the optimal probability of capacity investment as follows: 
{
v;_* (Sft , s}t , s]t , sift )= Vi (Sft , s}t , s}t ) +sift 
Va* (Sft , s}t, c}t> Ebft ) = Vo (Sft , s}t, s]t ) + sb'ft 
if firm f invests 
if firm f does not invest 
(1.24) 
where V * (-) represents an indirect value function and both sift and sb'ft capture 
errors following independent and identical extreme value distributions. The quality 
and capacity investment cost shocks are drawn from the estimated distribution of s}t 
with mean 0 and standard error CJ8 , and from the estimated distribution of c ft with 
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mean 0 and standard error O""~, respectively. Note that the standard errors 0"0 and 
O""~ are ones of cost parameters that have to be est imated . To estimate the ex-ante 
value of the state with two binary choices (invest or not invest), I simply follow the 
approach described below: 
1. For a given observed state, I draw two shocks Eoft and E1Jt from the standard 
normal distribution and generate the quality and capacity cost shocks s}t "' 
0"0 N ( 0, 1) , Eft "' O""~ N ( 0, 1) and simulate a path of play using the estimated 
functions and a set of shocks (w {]( w6 w"~ vVER vEXC vQUAL vDIFF) drawn 
' ' ' ' ' ' 
from the estimated distributions of the market profit shock, investment policies 
shocks and endogenous state transition shocks given the cost shock Eft· 
2. I simulate the evolution of each state variable with a large time length (100) and 
compute the present value of payoff-profits as.sociat ed with this path of play. 
3. I repeat this step many times (1000) and calculate the average of the present 
value of payoff-profi ts over all of simulated paths of play. 
4. This procedure yields an estimated ex-ante stream of payoff-profi ts associated 
with the quality investment cost shock. The linearity assumpt ion of cost pa-
rameters are also used in here and so I can estimate W1 , W2 and W3 under two 
different capacity investment strategies (XJt == 1 and XJt = 0) given the shock 
Eft = (cojt, Eljt): where W1 is the present discounted value of t he expected 
stream of market profits, w2 and w3 are the present discounted value of t he 
expected stream of quality investments and capacity investments respectively. 











where h ( ·) is a distribution function of c:}t with mean 0 and standard error IJ0 
and k (-) is a distribution function of c: ft with me~n 0 and standard error II7 . 
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For the simulation, the equation (1.26) is transformed as below: 
5. To estimate the probability of capacity investment I need to calculate a ratio 
of the exponential value function with capacity investment over the sum of the 
exponential value function with capacity investment and the exponential value 
function without capacity investment associated with the given cost shock : 
(1.26) 
6. Repeating this procedure many times (1000) by drawing several cost shocks 
and averaging them over all of these paths gives me an estimated probability of 
capacity investment with the given state. 
1.6.2.4 Search for Capacity Investment Cost Estimates 
In this section, I discuss the search for capacity investment cost parameters that 
sets the average over all states of the difference ·::>etween the observed capacity in-
vestment decision and the probability of capacity investment predicted by the model 
equal to zero. Because capacity investment is the binary choice, the observed capacity 
decision is written as 1 if the firm decides to invest and 0 otherwise. For the moment 
condition of capacity investment , I use the average over all states of the differences. 
I then define the moment condition of capacity investment as follows: 
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T S 
G2 = :S L L (Xobserved (SJt)- Pr (XJt = 1 I Sjt)) 
t=l s=l 
(1.27) 
The method that I used gives me only two moment conditions because I have 
two investment decisions (quality-upgrade and capacity expansion) in this chapter. 
However, I need to identify three cost parameters c = { cq, 0"0 , cc, O"' }. This can be 
solved by adding additional moment conditions based on the covariance between the 
difference between observed investments and state variables as follows: 
(1.28) 
T S 
G4 = :S L L ( (Xobserved (SJt) - Pr (XJt == 1 I Sjt)) · DJ F FJt) 
t=l s=l 
(1.29) 
I finally estimate cost parameters by m1mm1zmg a quadratic form m these three 
moment conditions as follows: 
(1.30) 
1. 7 Empirical Results 
I obtain the first set of demand parameter estimates simply by regressing the 
dependent variable on several regressors. 18 This is possible because I include firm 
specific fixed-effects that create an error term in the logit demand model for a market 
specific deviation that is not correlated with prices, and therefore do not need to 
use any instrumental variables to account for correlations between prices and errors. 
18The demand model and estimation are explained in Appendix 1. 
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For the dependent variable, I calculate the difference between the logarithm of each 
product market share and the logarithm of the market share of outside products 
available in the U.S. automobile market. I use the product quality level as an observed 
characteristic variable. In addition, I add a constant to ensure that the variable 
~Jt + ~~ has a zero mean. All automobile prices are in thousands of 1983 dollars 
in this chapter, and the results are presented in Table 1.2. The coefficients on the 
product quality levels and prices are intuitive and significant in the sense that I expect 
the marginal utility to be increasing in the observed quality levels and decreasing in 
the prices. This suggests that the firm fixed-effects capture well firm-specific features 
in prices. The price elasticity of demand is estimated to be 0. 793, implying that a 
one percent increase in the price brings about less than a one percent decrease in 
the automobile purchased. This may explain investment behavior of Japanese firms 
which incurs significant sunk costs in the sense that they are able to invest in quality-
upgrades and/or to participate in FDI by increasing prices. The anecdotal evidence 
that Japanese firms increased product prices without losing any market shares in the 
early years of the VER period supports this possibility. The coefficient on product 
quality levels is 0.822, which also rationalizes firmE behavior to upgrade quality by 
investing in R&D or adopting the new technology. 
I use demand estimates and an assumption of Bertrand-Nash pricing to recover 
product marginal costs . I observe product prices and firm market shares from the 
data. I also have the estimated coefficient on prices from the demand estimation. 
The markup equation (1.40) thus allows me to recover the product marginal costs 
by substituting the observed values into the equation and then to compute market 
profit values. I am then able to estimate the market profit equation as a function of 
state variables. Note that as the state variables are used to estimate and simulate 
payoff-profits (market profits and two investment policies) for the dynamic model , 
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all coefficients on state variables are important and are expected to be intuitive. 
The estimated effects of state variables on market profits are shown in Table 1.3. The 
negative impact of the VERs on the market profit indicates that overall market profits 
decrease during the VER period because the VERs control Japanese car sales through 
the restricted numbers . The negative impact of the time trend on the market profit 
tends to reflect the fact that a recession began in the early 1990s in the U.S ., which 
led to weak product sales and operation losses in the U.S. automobile industry. The 
positive impacts of past investment decisions on the market profit indicate that both 
past FDI and quality-upgrade experiences enable Japanese firms to increase market 
profits rationalizing their quality and capacity investment decisions for higher market 
profits. The positive impact of the foreign exchange rate on the market profit has the 
expected sign. This explains that the U.S. dollar depreciation makes consumers switch 
their relative demand to cheaper domestic cars, which leads to decrease market profits. 
The higher relative quality increases market profits as expected, which encourages 
firms to invest in quality-upgrade. I include a quadratic term of the difference between 
exports and limits to capture whether market profits decrease as the square of the 
difference state variable.19 Interestingly, the market profits decrease as the square of 
the excess of exports, which suggests that there was a penalty mechanism to control 
Japanese exports if a firm exports beyond a threshold level. 20 Thus, Japanese firms 
have to invest in quality-upgrade and/or participate in FDI to mitigate their penalty 
if their exports fail to meet the threshold level. The relative quality interacted with 
the last FDI decision captures the substitution effect of the two types of investment 
decisions on the market profit. The negative coefficient indicates that a firm who 
191 only include a quadratic term of difference in the sense that it gives me the best fit after 
much experimentation by including and excluding various quadratic and interaction terms of state 
variables. 
20 The threshold level is greater than zero in my result implying that if firms export more than 
trade limits within the threshold level they are still able ·;o increase market profits without the 
penalty. However , they will get penalized if their exports exceed the threshold level. 
41 
experienced FDI in the last period has a smaller marginal effect of relative quality 
on the market profit than the firm without past FDI experience , which implies that 
firms are unlikely to invest in a quality-upgrade following the FDI experience. This 
supports the hypothesis that firms consider the two investment decisions as inter-
temporal substitutes. 
In addition to the market profit estimation, both quality and capacity investment 
policy functions must be estimated in the first stage. The estimation results for the 
quality investment equation as a function of various state variables are presented 
in Table 1.4. As I expected, the VER state catalyzes quality-upgrade of Japanese 
firms although it is statistically insignificant. Interestingly, I find that the past FDI 
experience controls the current quality-upgrade decision. This suggests that the two 
investment activities are negatively correlated in a dynamic framework because firms 
are likely to consider the two types of investments as substitutes. The negative impact 
of foreign exchange rates on quality investment decisions suggests that the U.S. dollar 
depreciation stimulates quality-upgrade activities of Japanese firms in the U.S., such 
as launching premium divisions given relatively cheaper costs. However, the firms 
stop upgrading product quality once they have higher relative quality because they 
know that their products are already good enough to be marketable. I include a 
quadratic term of the difference between exports and limits to capture how fast an 
incentive of quality-upgrade increases as an excess of exports increases. I also add the 
relative quality variable interacted with the VER dummy to examine an incentive of 
quality-upgrade under the VER period. Interestingly, the marginal effect of the excess 
of exports on the quality-upgrade decision increases. The trade restriction alleviates 
the negative effect of higher relative quality on the quality-upgrade decision. This 
implies that the firms who are currently suffering from the trade restriction are more 
likely to upgrade quality than the firms without the trade restriction. 
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Table 1.5 shows the effects of various state variables on the capacity investment 
decision. The VERs catalyze FDI of J apanese firms in order to overcome the trade 
restriction as expected. The lagged FDI and quality-upgrade variables are not statis-
tically significant but they have expected signs t hat the firms aJ·e unlikely to upgrade 
quality and to open production plants once they participated in FDI in the last pe-
riod. These results provide the possibility that two investment activities incur signifi-
cant sunk costs, which introduces inter-temporal interactions in investment decisions. 
Moreover , we can say that the two investment choices can be seen as substitutes in a 
dynamic framework because one investment decision is restricted by another invest-
ment experience occurred in the past period. The foreign exchange rates negatively 
affect FDI decisions: the U.S. dollar depreciation encourages Japanese firms to par-
ticipate in FDI because it is cheaper to invest in the U.S. than before without the 
dollar depreciation. The higher relative quality level also positively affect t he firms 
to enter into the U.S. through FDI, which suggests that they want to switch their 
investment strategy from quality-upgrades to FDI as long as they currently have a 
sufficient number of vehicles with high quality levels to attract consumers. I find 
that the marginal effect of an excess of exports on FDI decisions increases , implying 
that the firms strongly prefer participating in capaci.ty expansion through FDI if their 
exports fail to meet the required trade limits. 
Table 1.6, 1.7, 1.8 and 1.9 present estimation results of state variable t ransitions. 
These state transition functions are crucial to produce estimates of dynamic cost pa-
rameters in the second stage. Japanese firms are able to observe the current period's 
two investment experiences for the future state characteristics. As a result, I do not 
need to estimate the state transition functions of two past investment decisions be-
cause firms' beliefs about the past quality-upgrade and FDI are always predet ermined. 
I assume that the future VER variable depends on the first period of the VER state 
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in my model. This implies that Japanese producers believe that the VER will be 
imposed for their entire lives if they observe the restriction in the first period. Other 
state variables are not predetermined so I construct each state transition function 
based on observed dat a to rationalize beliefs of Japanese firms. 
I assume that state transition functions of foreign exchange rates follow a first-
order Markov process. Although, an AR(l) process is not a perfect way to estimate 
foreign exchange rates between Japan and the U.S. , it is , I believe, the best specifica-
tion and it fits the few available data well. The coefficient on lagged exchange rates 
has a strong positive auto-correlation (0.9222) as shown in Table 1.7. 
For relative quality levels and differences between exports and trade limits, I make 
transition functions conditional on two investment decisions as well as its own previous 
state because both future state variables are likely to be affected by current investment 
activities as well as its own current state variable. Table 1.8 presents the estimation 
results of the relative quality state transition. The future relative quality levels are 
positively affected by the current relative quality levels and current quality-upgrade 
activity. Interestingly, the current FDI experience has a negative impact on the future 
relative quality levels although it is not significant. This implies that Japanese cars 
produced in the U.S. through FDI are likely to be lower in quality as compared to 
the cars exported from Japan.21 Table 1.9 reports the estimation results of the state 
transition of the difference between exports and limits. Both current quality-upgrade 
and FDI experiences reduce the difference between exports and trade limits. This 
suggests that if Japanese firms participate in either quali ty-upgrades or FDI then 
they are able to meet trade limits (decrease quantities exported) by exporting high 
quality cars or selling more U.S . produced cars . 
21 Note that I use the sales weighted median value of all product quality levels available in a firm 
as the firm 's quality levels. If there are many Japanese cars produced in the U.S. after FDI and they 
are likely to be in lower quality as compared to J apanese cars exported from J apan then they can 
decrease relative quality levels as well as the firm 's quality levels. 
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The results of the second stage estimation are described in Table 1.10. The dy-
namic parameter estimates regarding the quality-upgrade cost and FDI cost are both 
reported. I find that both quality-upgrades and FDI activities are associated with 
large sunk costs, which introduce inter-temporal linkages in investment decisions, 
and the entry costs of undertaking FDI are larger than the fixed adjustment costs 
of quality-upgrade. This implies that the start-up cost s of entering into the U.S. to 
build a production plant are more substantial than the per-period costs of upgrading 
quality levels . The marginal cost of quality-upgrades and sunk costs of FDI have the 
expected sign and magnitudes of 1.856 and 4. 779 respectively. The marginal quality-
upgrade cost indicates that a unit increase (HP / Weight) in quality level would cost 
about $1.9 billion. This estimate is similar to the observed Japanese average R&D 
expenditures of$ 1.69 billion reported in Fuss and Waverman (1992).22 The FDI cost 
parameter suggests that if Japanese firms enter into the U.S. to open a production 
plant, they would spend about $4.8 billion for the plant.23 This estimate is in the 
same range as the actual capital investment of $ 4 billion for Honda's Marysville auto-
plant .24 The standard errors of investment cost shocks are estimated to be 0.001 and 
0.014 respectively in a relatively small magnitude as compared to the two investment 
costs , indicating that the actual investment levels are close to the optimal investment 
levels predicted by t he model. This implies that investment decisions conducted by 
Japanese firms are fairly stable and consistent with the model. 
22Fuss and Waverman (1992) report annual R&D expenditures of Japanese au tomobile firms from 
1980 to 1988. So I average total R&D expenditures over a:t l periods and divide it by the number of 
J apanese automakers in the U.S. automobile market in 1980s (eight firms). 
23 The average annual production capacity of J apanese firms in the U.S. is 280 ,000 units and most 
plant sizes are in the similar range (250,000-300,000 units) . 
24 Although I cannot collect all capital investment information for J apanese auto plants in the U.S., 
Honda reports its capital investments for three production plants in its official website. Honda's 
capital investment in Marysville reported from http: / johio .honda.com / manufacturing/map.cfm 
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1.8 Policy Experiments 
The dynamic structural model developed above allows me to simulate various 
counterfactual policy experiments. My primary interest is to el valuate the effect of 
voluntary export restraints on investment decisions of Japanese firms. In addition, I 
want to examine the substitution effect between quality-upgrades and foreign direct 
investment (FDI). In light of these objectives, my policy experiments are divided into 
four different scenarios; 1) the difference of quality-upgrade decisions across trade 
regimes (including the VERs and excluding the VERs) ; 2) the difference of FDI 
decisions across trade regimes (including the VERs and excluding the VERs); 3) 
the difference of quality-upgrade decisions across FDI regimes (allowing FDI and 
restricting FDI) ; and 4) the difference of FDI decisions across quality-upgrade regimes 
(allowing quality-upgrade and restricting quality-upgrade). 
As my interest in this chapter is in looking at two types of investment behavior 
of J apanese firms rather than looking at social welfare,25 I do not compute the value 
function of the theoretical model with dynamic investment cost parameters in order 
to conduct various counterfactual regimes. 26I therefore only simulate quality and ca-
pacity investment as a function of state variables many t imes (1000) with different 
policy regimes to examine the effects of the trade restriction on investment incentives. 
Several counterfactual exercises can be constructed by changing the values of the 
state variables associated with a specific regime. This comes from the fact that beliefs 
of Japanese producers about market states are always affected by industry policies. 
First, I examine the difference of quality-upgrade decisions between when the VERs 
25 However, I p lan to conduct welfare analysis by introducing Berry, Levinsohn and Fakes (1995) 
in order to see how investment decisions affect J apanese producer profits. 
26Several application chapters of Bajari, Benkard and Levin (2007) compute the Markov-perfect 
equilibrium of the theoretical model with dynamic cost pa,rameters to conduct policy experiments. 
This procedure is necessary to evaluate the welfare. 
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occur over a period of several years and when the VERs never occur. To achieve 
this , I assume that Japanese producers believe that the VERs will never be imposed 
for their entire lives if they do not observe the trade restriction in the first period. 
According to this assumption, I am able to take zeros for all VER dummy state 
variables. I then simulate a new optimal quality investment as a function of the new 
state vector, and also simulate several state transition functions based on the new 
VER states and new optimal quality investment. I do simulations with a large time 
length (30). Figure 1.4 shows the quality-upgrade levels of Japanese firms under an 
actual trade regime and a hypothetical trade regime, and Table 1.11 quantifies the 
average quality-upgrade levels in both regimes. Each point is computed by averaging 
each period's optimal quality investment level over many simulated paths (1000) of 
play at the average state.27 I find that quality-upgrade levels would decrease by 50 
percent in the absence of VERs. This means that Japanese automakers would be 
likely to export relatively low quality automobiles, such as Civic or Corolla, rather 
than higher quality products, such as Lexus or Acura, in the absence of VERs. 28 Or 
we can understand that Japanese automakers would have lower incentive to upgrade 
product quality or to launch luxury divisions without VERs. This implies that VERs 
are one of the main factors driving quality investment of Japanese firms. 
The second scenario is to examine the difference of FDI decisions between when 
the VERs are in place for a period of several years compared to when VERs were 
never in effect . I also examine the effect of the U.S. dollar depreciation on FDI 
27By averaging the investment policy profile over many simulated paths of play and then averaging 
it again over all state variables yields an estimate of average optimal investment policy at each 
simulated period. Since my data span 1977 to 1996 and some of Japanese producers entered the 
U.S. auto market in the middle of 1980s, the VERs are associated with the early simulated period 
(T=30). 
28This may be true if we see in the data of Toyota as an example that the medium quality level of 
Toyota was 0.4177 hp/ weight and 0.5212 hp/weight before and after introducing Lexus respectively. 
The magnitude of quality level change in the simulations is 25 percent which is nearly equivalent to 
switching between Lexus (high quality car) and Corolla (low quality cars). 
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decisions in the absence of VERs. To control for the dramatic dollar depreciation 
observed in 1985 and 1986, I use the value of the foreign exchange rate observed 
in 1977 for each initial state and simulate future foreign exchange rates based on 
the estimated state transition function . Figures 1.5 and 1.6 present the capacity 
investment decisions of Japanese producers under actual trade policy (including VERs 
with U.S. dollar depreciation) and hypothetical trade policies (excluding VERs with 
U.S. dollar depreciation, and excluding VERs without U.S. dollar depreciation), and 
Tables 1.12 and 1.13 quantify the average probabilities of FDI in several regimes. Each 
point is computed by averaging each period 's probability of capacity investment over 
many simulated paths (1000) of play at an average state. I find that the probability of 
FDI decreases by 52.4 percent when the VERs were never in effect and when the U.S. 
government still depreciates the U.S. dollar. Interestingly, the probability of capacity 
investment dramatically decreases by 93 percent without U.S. dollar depreciation in 
the absence of VERs. These results imply that other factors , such as costs of exports 
and FDI entry costs, also drive FDI decisions.29 
An interesting feature of Japanese investment behavior is that each investment 
decision is negatively affected by the past experience of another investment in terms 
of substitution effect. For instance, Japanese producers are likely to stop investing in 
quality-upgrade for a certain length of time (about a year) after FDI and, similarly, 
they tend to stop participating in FDI for a similar length of time after quality-
29 Most of the trade literature on exports and FDI explain that other things equal, when trans-
portation cost of exports increases, it gets more and more costly to ship goods across between 
countries so it becomes more tempting to set up a subsidiary abroad to service the foreign market 
directly via FDI. Moreover, the larger the firm level returns to scale relat ive to the plant level to 
scale, the less costly in term of efficiency it is for a given firm to split up its production between 
different countries . Production plants in foreign countries benefit from the increasing returns to scale 
of the multinational firm , and there is little cost lost from building these new production plants. 
Hence, a firm has an incentive to become a multinational firm , and set up plants in foreign countries 
instead of exporting all its output. This is known as the proximity-concentration trade-off. I think 
that foreign exchange rates can capture the proximity-concentration trade-off in the sense that the 
transportation cost of exports cannot immediately reflect the dollar depreciation but FDI activities 
by purchasing the U.S. affiliates can take advantage of the dollar depreciation quickly. 
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upgrade. Thus it is worth considering how each investment decision would change 
when another investment is restricted. If two investment decisions are substitutes for 
each other, the mechanism for restricting one of investment activities will increase 
another investment strategy. Or, the mechanism will have a negative impact on 
another investment strategy if the two investment decisions are more likely to be 
complements of each other. 
The third scenario is to evaluate the difference of quality-upgrade levels of Japanese 
firms when FDI is prohibited. To achieve this, J apanese producers are assumed to 
believe that they are not able to enter into the U.S. to build production plants. Ac-
cording to this assumption, I take zeros for all the past FDI state variables . Moreover, 
all capacity investment functions are set to zeros. I simulate a new optimal quality 
investment as a function of a new state vector and also simulate several state tran-
sition functions based on the new states and new optimal quality investment. I do 
simulations with a large time length (30) . Figure 1.7 presents t he quality invest-
ment decisions of Japanese producers with actual investment policy and hypothetical 
FDI restriction and Table 1.14 quantifies the average quality-upgrade levels in both 
regimes. Each point is computed by averaging each period 's optimal quality invest-
ment over many simulated paths (1000) of play at the average state. In the absence 
of FDI, quality-upgrade levels dramatically increase by 129 percent, suggesting that 
Japanese producers would devote all attention to investing in quality upgrade as the 
substitute of FDI when it is prohibited because this is t he only way to overcome the 
trade restriction. 30 
The last scenario is to examine the difference of FDI decisions of Japanese firms 
when quality-upgrade are prohibited, such as the case of a ban on exporting higher 
quality automobiles. For this analysis, J apanese automakers are assumed to believe 
30Here , an increase in quality-upgrade can be explained that Japanese automakers are likely to 
export more luxury automobiles if the FDI policy is prohlbited. 
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that they are not able to export any high quality cars so they do not invest in quality-
upgrade. According to this assumption, I can take zeros for all quality investment 
functions . Moreover, to capture the pure substitution effect between quality-upgrade 
and FDI decisions when quality-upgrade is restricted, T need to control for relative 
quality levels because higher relative quality levels strongly encourage the firms to 
participate in FDI, which is observed in Table 1.5. I therefore use the relative quality 
levels simulated in the actual case (quality-upgrade allowed) to control the negative 
effect of decreasing relative quality on FDI incentives. I simulate a new optimal prob-
ability of FDI as a function of a new state vector and also simulate several state 
transition functions based on the new states and new optimal probability of FDI. I 
do simulations with a large time length (30) . Figure 1.8 shows the effect of quality-
upgrade restriction on the probability of FDI, and Table 1.15 quantifies the average 
probabilities of FDI in both regimes. I find that the probability of FDI increases by 
11.1 percent in the absence of quality-upgrade, which implies that Japanese produc-
ers would increase their participation in FDI as the substitute for quality-upgrade 
when the quality-upgrade are not available. However, the absence of quality-upgrade 
does not dramatically encourage FDI participation of Japanese firms as compared 
to the effect of FDI restriction on the quality-upgrade level because entry costs of 
undertaking FDI are more expensive than fixed adjustment costs of quality-upgrade. 
1.9 Conclusion 
In this chapter, I develop a dynamic structural model of a single agent decision 
in order to analyze the effect of voluntary export restraints (VERs) , combined with 
other state characteristics, on two types of investment decisions of Japanese firms in 
the U.S. automobile industry: quality-upgrade and FDI. I find that the two types 
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of investment decisions are substitutes in a dynamic framework. I also find that 
both investment activities are associated with substantial sunk costs, and that the 
entry costs of FDI are larger than the fixed adjustment costs of quality-upgrade. A 
static model may often miscalculate both investment costs, and it may not accurately 
reflect the important aspects of firms' investment decisions according to the changes 
in trade regime because the substitutions of investment decisions occur in a dynamic 
framework and cannot be observed in a static analysis. Thus, a dynamic model 
provides a more appropriate framework to analyze the investment behavior. 
An interesting extension of the chapter would be to examine the effect of Japanese 
investment decisions due to the VERs on investment decisions of the U.S. domestic 
and European automakers within a dynamic competition framework. In this en-
vironment, investment decisions of Japanese producers may affect domestic and/or 
European producers ' investment strategies. There are several chapters that have al-
ready studied the effect of VERs on quality-upgrade as well as on prices when there 
is competition and most of them find that VERs led to increases in both prices and 
product quality levels of the U.S. domestic and European producers in the U.S. auto-
mobile market. However, Japanese investment experiences due to VERs might have 
negatively affected the U.S domestic capacity investment decisions due to decreas-
ing domestic market shares. This appears true in an examination of the number of 
plant closures and start-ups in the U.S. during the VERs: many production plants of 
the big three domestic producers were likely to shut down or merge with each other, 
or convert from car to truck production. On the other hand, European producers 
may have had an opportunity to enter into the U.S. for production plants following 
successful Japanese FDI if they believed that they were likely to have export restric-
tions in the near future. The fact that some European producers, such as BMW 
and Mercedes-Benz, actually began to open their production facilities in the U.S. in 
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the middle of the 1990s suggests that this would be an interesting subject for future 
research. 
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Appendix 1-A: Demand and Market Profit 
Let time be assumed discrete with an infinite horizon and indexed by t E 1, 2,-- - , oo. 
Consumer i 's utility from purchasing product j at time t is defined as follows: 
(1.31) 
where Qualityjt indexes product j's quality level and Pjt is the price of product j. 
The variable ~jt represents unobserved characteristics of product j and ~f is the firm 
f's specific dummy variable (firm fixed-effects) when the product j is produced by the 
firm f . The variable Eijt is an idiosyncratic logit error term and it captures consumer 
specific heterogeneity. Outside products complete the demand system. The outside 
options are relatively large in my data because they allow consumers to choose non-
Japanese products in the U.S . automobile market . The consumer i chooses these 
outside options if the utility derived from purchasing outside products exceeds the 
utility derived from purchasing any inside options. The utility of outside products is 
given by: 
UiQt = ~0 + EiQt (1.32) 
The mean utility of outside product is normalized to zero so that it anchors valuations 
of inside products. 
There are F firms in the automobile industry and each firm produces a subset 
of J products . Firms are assumed to choose product prices each period in order to 
maximize their total market profits: 
II ft = 2::: (Pjt - Tn-cjt) SjtMt 
j EJJ 
(1.33) 
where J1 denotes a set of products the firm f produces , Mt is a market size of the 
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U.S. automobile industry in period t and mCjt is a marginal cost of producing product 
j in period t. The variable Sjt denotes product j's market share in period t as follows: 
(1.34) 
Thus, each product price Pjt must satisfy the following first order condition as 
below: 
(1.35) 
By using equation (1.35) , I find the derivatives of product market share as follows: 
if r and j are the same 
otherwise 
Appendix 1-B: Demand Estimation and Computation of 
Marginal Cost 
(1.36) 
I define product market share as Sjt = Qjt/ Mt where Qjt is product j 's quantity 
being sold and Mt is the market size of the U.S. automobile industry in period t. I 
use a simple logit demand model to estimate the consumer demand: 
(1.37) 
where Sot denotes the market share of outside products, Qualityjt indexes product j's 
quality level and P)t is the price of product j. The variable ~jt represents unobserved 
characteristics of product j and ~f is the firm f's specific dummy variable (firm fixed-
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effect) when the product j is produced by the firm f. The main problem of demand 
estimation is correlation between prices and unobserved characteristics ~jt, which re-
quires instrumental variables. Nevo (2000) explains that including brand fixed-effects 
in the demand model is able to solve this endogeneity problem without any instru-
mental variables. The brand-specific dummy variable captures both mean of observed 
characteristics aqQualityjt that do not vary by markets and mean of unobserved com-
ponents ~jt · The error term is now market-specific deviation(6~jt = ~jt- ~f), which 
is not correlated with prices. Thus I use a simple OLS regression by including firm 
(brand) fixed-effects to estimate the logit demand equation. 
Marginal costs are not observed so I find a markup equation that satisfies the first 
order condition derived from the static model in which firm f chooses each product 
price to maximize the current value of market profit. To recover the marginal cost 
parameter for each product , I use the markup property M arkupft = Pjt - mcjt = 
Prt- mcrt, Vj, r E F, proposed by Anderson, De Palma and Thisse (1992). Then I 
am able to compute the simple markup equation as follows: 
1 
M arkupft = Pjt - mcjt = --;---------c-
aP ( 1 - "i:.jEF Sjt) 
(1.38) 
where "i:.jEF Sjt is the total market share of firm f. 
Appendix 1-C: Derivation of the Markup Equation 
In a matrix form: 
p- 'mC = n-1s(p, Quality,~' ~F) (1.39) 
where s(-), p, and me are J x 1 vectors of product market shares, prices and marginal 
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costs respectively. The variable S1 is a J x J matrix wit h the element: 
-aPs 1 (s1 - 1) - aPs1s2 -aPs l SJ-l - aP515J 
- aPs2s1 -aPs2 ( s2 - 1) - aP52SJ-l - a P525J 
D= 
- aPSJ-151 - aP5J - l 52 - aPSJ - l ( 5J- l - 1) - aP5J-l5J 
- aPSJ5l - aP5J 52 -aP5 J 5 J - l -aP5J (5J- 1) 
where, 
if j and rare produced by the same firm 
otherwise 
(1.40) 
I produce a simple example to derive t he inverse matrix of D; There are two firms 
(F1 and F2) in a market. The F1 produces P1 and P2. The F 2 produces P3 and P 4. 
The inverse matrix of S1 is as follows: 
82 - 1 -1 0 0 
aP8l (l - 81-82) aP(l - 81 - 82) 
- 1 81- 1 0 0 
D - 1 = aP(l - 81 - 82) aP8l (1-81-82) (1.41) 
0 0 8~- l - 1 
aP83(l-83 - 84) aP( l -83 - 84) 
0 0 - 1 8J- l 
aP(l-83 - 84) aP84(l - 83 - 84) 
By using (1.43), I am able to compute the markup equation in this example as 
below: 
82 - l -1 0 0 
aP8 l (l-8l-82) aP(l-81 - 82) 5 1 
- 1 81- 1 0 0 5 2 aP( l - 81-82) aPs2( l -Sl-S2) p-mc= 
0 0 8 - l - 1 
aP83( l -s3 - s4) aP(l - s3 - s4) 53 
0 0 - 1 8J- l 54 
aP(l - S3-S4) aPs4( l -83-s4) 
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(1.42) 
I finally have the general markup equation with product j produced by firm f 
from (1.44) as follows: 
1 
P]t - mc1t = ----c--------c-
aP ( 1 - l:jEF Sjt) 
(1.43) 
Figure 1.1: Quality and Capacity Investment per Year 
HONDA ISUZU MAZDA 
0.2 r-----.,------ .---- -----, 0.08 r------ ---.r---- ---, 0.1 ,---------.---~-----, 
0.15 0.06 
0.1 0.04 0.05 
0.05 
,09 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 
oo~ f Ill I. I 
1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 ,09 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 
MITSUBISH NISSAN SUBARU 
0.1 r-------,r-~-------, 0.1 r------.----~-------, 0.1 r---------,-,--~-----, 
0.05 0.05 0.05 
Q I W , W W W W. W 1 0 I • • • • • • • • • I I O' ••• . •• • · ••• I 
1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 
SUZUKI TOYOTA 
om r---- --- ---- -----, 0.1 r--------,r---.r---~-----, 
- Quality-Upgrade Level (HP/Weight) 
002 - Years ofFDI Entry 
0.05 X-Axis: Year 
0.01 Y-Axis : Quality-Upgrade Level 
Q I W • • • • 
1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 ,09 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 
CJl 
---.! 
Figure 1.2: Difference Between Japanese Exports and VER Limits per Year 
X 104 
10,---~~~----------------~ 
HONDA X 104 ISUZU X 104 MAZDA 
0 5 
5 -5 0 
0 -10 -5 
-5 
81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 
-15 -10 
81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 
x 104 MITSUBISH X 105 NISSAN X 105 SUBARU 






-4 -0 .5 
-6 
81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 
-2 -1 
81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 
X 104 SUZUKI X 105 TOYOTA 
0.-----~--~--~ 1 
X-axis : Year (VER Period) 





81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 
-2~~~~~~--~~~~~--~ 
81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 
C!1 
00 












1970 1978 111:11 1!m 1!!34 
Year 















+ In cluding VERs (Normal) 































+ Including YERs (Normal) 
0 Excluding YERs (Counterfactual) 
10 15 20 25 3D 
Simulated Time 
60 
Figure 1.6: Effect of VERs on Capacity Investment without Dollar Depreciation 
0.7 
+ Including YERs (NormaQ 
0.6 

















0 10 .. , ,.5 ._ ... 20 30 
Simulated Time 
61 
















+ Both Investments Allowed (Normal) 







Figure 1.8: Effect of Quality Investment Restriction on Capacity Investment Policy 
0.7 
+ Both Investments Allowed (Norma~ 
0.6 



















+ ~ ¥¥~ 
(jlijl'li OL---__ _L ______ L_ ____ _L __ ~~~~~~~~~~ 
0 5 10 15 20 25 30 
Simulated Time 
62 
Table 1.1: Summary Statistics 
Variable Mean Median Std Minimum Maximum 
Price ($ •000) 11.711 9.835 6.822 4.670 55.900 
Unit Sold (1 ,000•s) 52.828 29 .106 6.834 0.001 1000.233 
Product Quality Level 0.450 0.432 0.112 0.120 0.914 
Product Market Share 0.006 0.003 0.007 0 0.105 
VER Year 0.571 1 0.497 0 1 
Exchange Rate(¥ j$) 168.460 144.600 56 .117 93.960 268.620 
Firm-Level Relative Quality 1.012 1.028 0.143 0.626 1.361 
Difference (1,000,000•s) -0.017 0 0.054 -0.243 0.087 
Quality Investment 0.011 0 0.022 0 0.136 
Capacity Investment 0.071 0 0.259 0 1 
Firm Market Share 0.029 0.017 0.010 0 0.156 
Market Size (1,000,000•s) 9.519 9.751 1.073 7.765 11 .318 
Prices are adj usted in constant 1983 dollars. 
Each product quality level is defined as HP/ Weight (HP is divided by lO•s of lbs). 
Quality Inves tment is measured as the difference b etween median value of current p roduct quality levels and 
median value of past product quality levels. 
Difference is measured as the difference between units exported and limits , interacted with the VER dummies. 
Market size is t otal units sold in the U.S . automobile industry including Japanese automakers. 
Table 1.2: Demand Estimat es 
Dependent Variable: ln(Annual Firm Market Share)-ln (Annual Outside Market Share) 
J Variable Coefficient Standard Error J 
Constant -0.951 0.260 
ln(Price) 0.793 0.085 
ln( Quality) 0. 822 0.214 
Firm (Brand) Fixed Effects Yes 
Adjusted R-Squared 0.7001 
Number of Observations 2012 
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Table 1.3: Effect of Firm's State Variables on Annual Market Profit 
Dep endent Variable: Annua l M arket Profit in Billions of 1983 Dollars 
Variable Coefficient Standard Error I 
Constant 1.141 1.324 
Time Trend -0.020 0.013 
VER Dummy -0.093 0.062 
Lag FDI 0.329 0.079 
Lag Quality-Upgrade 0.025 0.006 
ln(Exchange Rate) 0.417 0.232 
Relative Quality 1.603 0.196 
Difference 1.988 1.030 
Difference2 -16.091 6.288 
Lag FDI·Relative Quality -0.041 0.079 
Firm Fixed Effects Yes 
Adjusted R-Squared 0.743 
Number of Observations 140 
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Table 1.4: Effect of State Variables on Quality Investment 
Dependent Variable: Annual Q uality Investment Level 
Variable Coefficient Standard Error I 
Constant 0.186 0.104 
Time Trend -0.003 0.010 
VERDummy 0.006 0.012 
Lag FDI -0.021 0.012 
Lag Quality-Upgrade -0.002 0.004 
ln(Exchange Rate) -0 .016 0.018 
Relative Quality -0 .101 0.022 
Difference 0.139 0.075 
Difference2 0.920 0.455 
Relative Quality ·VER Dummy 0.027 0.013 
Firm Fixed Effects Yes 
Adjusted R-Squared 0.544 
Number of Observations 132 
Table 1.5: Effect of State Variables on Capacity Investment (Probit) 
Dependent Variable: Annual Capacity Investment in t he U.S. Dum my 
Variable Coefficient Standard Error I 
Constant 24.203 12.681 
Time Trend -0.215 0.161 
VER Dummy 2.376 0.916 
Lag FDI -0.201 0.884 
Lag Quality-Upgrade -0.105 0.502 
ln(Exchange Rat e) -5 .581 2.301 
Relative Quality 3.419 2.254 
Difference 47.600 21.587 
Difference2 854.166 479.880 
Firm Fixed Effects No 
Prob> x 2 0.288 
Number of Observations 132 
Table 1.6: Exchange Rate Transit ion 
Dependent Variable: ln(Annual J apan / U.S. Foreign Exchange Rat e) 
Variable Coefficient Standard Error I 
Constant 
ln(Lag Exchange Rate) 
0.352 
0.922 





Table 1.7: Relative Quality Transition 
Dependent Variable: Annual Relative Quality 
Variable Coefficient Standard Error I 
Constant 0.149 0.047 
Lag Relative Quality 
Quality Investment 
Capacity Investment 





Table 1.8: Difference between Exports and VER Limits Transition 
Dependent Variable: Annual Difference between Exports and VER limits 
Variable Coefficient Standard Error I 
Constant -0.001 0.001 
Lag Difference 0.608 0.067 
Quality Investment -0.434 0.165 
Capacity Investment -0.021 0.011 
I Number of Observations 132 
Table 1.9: Dynamic Parameters 
Variable Coefficient 
Quality Investment Cost 
Capacity Investment Cost 
Standard Error of Quality Cost Shock 
Standard Error of Capacity Cost Shock 
I simulate 1000 times and averaged to obtain expected values. 






Table 1.10: Average Quality-Upgrade levels with and without VERs 





Table 1.11: Average Probabilities of FDI with and without VERs 
(Dollar Depreciation) 
Average Probability of FDI I 
VERs (Dollar Depreciation) 0.267 
No VERs (Dollar Depreciation) 0.127 
Table 1.12: Average Probabilities of FDI with and without VERs 
(No Dollar Depreciation) 
Average Probability of FDI I 
VERs (No Dollar Depreciation) 0.267 
No VERs (No Dollar Depreciation) 0.002 
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Table 1.13: Average Quality-Upgrade levels with and without FDI 





Table 1.14 Average Probabilities of FDI with and without Quality-Upgrade 
Quality-Upgrade 
No Quality-Upgrade 




Strategic Investments of Multinational Firms: 
Brands as Intangible Assets 
2.1 Introduction 
Brand management has become influential among industries and academia when 
Aaker (1991) published the seminal work on managing brand equity and the strength 
of brand. Annual report of the Top 100 global brands published by Interbrand in-
dicates that those strong brands bring the companies incredible financial worth and 
business earnings. Marketing managers regard a brand as an implicit promise that 
the level of quality customers have come to expect from a brand will continue with 
future purchases of the same product. Thus, when consumers are uncertain about 
product attributes, brand will be treated as a signal of product position (Erdem and 
Swait 1998) and product quality (Dawar and Parker 1994). Despite of the fact that 
branding is important, marketing managers were discouraged to justify investments 
in building brands due to unclear financial accountability, in a hands-off relationship 
where marketing is eager to maintain long-term consumer relationship by building 
brands (Fournier 1998) while finance measured returns for the short-term (Lehmann 
2004; Rust et al. 2004; See 2006) . More challenging, firms with potentially very dif-
ferent characteristics can affect its effects of asset return and risk (Markowitz 1952). 
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For example, when we look at the strong brands in Interbrand 2009 report such as 
Tiffany & Co. (rank #76) and BP (rank # 83), we expect that the magnitude of 
the role of brand would be different across various indust ries. The role of brand is 
traditionally much higher in the luxury industry than in the energy sector. Weerawar-
dena et al. (2006) found that firms which are under more competitive industry tend 
to build greater innovation capability, leading to higher brand performance. Aaker 
(1992) defined that a strong brand has four dimensions: awareness, associations, per-
ceived quality, and brand loyalty. Thus, when companies develop the brand equity, 
they should think through where they stand on each of four dimensions and which 
dimension is important to them. For example, companies in soft drinks industry (e.g., 
Coca-Cola) would focus more on awareness and associations whereas companies in IT 
Hardware (e.g., IBM) would invest more to increase perceived quality. It is critical 
to distinguish the role of strong brand within various industries. 
Recently, many published studies have emphasized the alignment of marketing 
and finance (Rao, Agarwal, and Dahlhoff 2004). As the movement to adopt share-
holder value-based measures of firm performance continues, marketing's traditional 
assumptions, which focused on success in the product market place, must be extended 
to address the marketing-finance interface. To do so, marketers advance the notion of 
market-based assets as a principal bridge between marketing and shareholder value 
(Anderson 1979). More generally, there is clear evidence that a firm's investment in 
market-based assets such as building strong brands through effective marketing can 
create value for their shareholders by yielding returns that are greater in magnitude 
(Srivastava, Shervani and Fahey 1998; Day and Fahey 1988). For example, Aaker and 
Jacobson (1994) suggested that companies should increase consumers' quality percep-
tions by conveying brand's quality image to the stock market and lead to higher stock 
return. 
71 
However , it is unclear that how strong brands affect returns and risk because the 
stock market is characterized by the trade-off between risk and return ; the higher 
the risk the investor is willing and able to take, the higher the potential rewards 
from the investment. Despite of the important fact that firm risk is also a critical 
component , there are limited studies in literature about the effect of brand manage-
ment on firm risk. Recently, Madden, Fehle , and Fournier (2006) empirically show 
that strong brands not only generate greater return but also decrease risk comparing 
to weak brands. Most existing literature has fo cused on effect of brand reputation 
that leads to reductions in firm risk in order that market ing managers may claim 
brand management as a part of t he firm's risk management strategy, in particular , 
when confronted with competing investment opportunities and increasing demands 
for spending accountability (McAlister, Srinivasan and Kim 2007; Rego, Billett and 
Morgan 2009). Those studies raise int riguing our research question: Are all strong 
brands negatively related to the risk among different industries which focus on various 
dimensions? 
A company brand name is considered to be one of the important and specific 
intangible assets (Barth, Kasznik , and McNichols 2001). It is true that intangible 
assets can create profits and shareholder value over the long run, which by their 
nature, are unique to the company. Not only consumers but also investors are looking 
for a recognizable icon or symbol that lets them feel confident and reliable under t he 
crowded market. Consumers treat a product wit h strong brand as a signal of better 
quality and more reliable (Keller 1993) ; for example, the Kelloggs brand means great 
breakfast cereals to the consumers. In analogy to the consumers, investors recognize 
the power of strong brands and are likely to trade the stocks which usually lead to 
higher stock trading volume. The liquidity risk is a common measure to evaluate the 
risk of difficulty of selling an asset/stock. Thus , we propose to include liquidity risk 
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in the model to get t he complete risk profile of the strong brands. 
The previous literature that has focused on the role of the brand in reducing risk 
has largely ignored t he influence of brand volatility as an intangible asset on a firm 's 
level of risk. Millward Brown, a leading research company, found that the companies 
within the S&P 500 which are associated with higher intangible assets value tend to 
be more volatile and riskier (Millward Brown 2007). Firms whose intangible assets 
accounted for a larger percentage of their value tend to be more volatile because of 
partial excludability and non-marketability. That is, brand values as an intangible 
asset can be a benefit for a limited duration, given frequent changes in customers' 
tastes (partial excludability) and are generally not traded in active and transparent 
markets (non-marketability). Lev (2005) said t hat "this unique ability of intangibles 
to enable companies to withstand competitive pressure and prevail is responsible for 
their remarkable ascendance to the role of premier corporate and national assets. In 
a sense, intangibles are high-risk/high-reward assets (p.302) ." 
In this chapter, we extend the previous literature that has focused on the effect of 
brand performance on risk without consideration of the downside of building value on 
brands as intangible assets, using a new liquidity-augmented Capital Asset Pricing 
Model and explore what effect market and liquidity risks have on firms, finding ways 
to more effectively manage their limited resources between intangibles and tangibles, 
shifting a fundamental strategic indicator. That is, we seek to fill the gap with respect 
to the trade-off between the role of the brand as an intangible asset in increasing mar-
ket (objective) risk and the brands through effective marketing in reducing liquidity 
(subjective) risk by shareholders, issues not examined in previous research. We find 
an empirical result that market risk factors generally have positive reactions, while 
liquidity risk factors tend to have negative relations, when firms increase its strategic 
indicator on an intangible asset, rather than on a tangible asset. 
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The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. In the next section , we 
provide a brief overview of a traditional Capital Asset Pricing Model and a new 
liquidity-augmented Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM). Section 2.3 introduces 
modifying strategic emphasis on brand-based advertising expenditure as an intangible 
asset versus capital expenditure as a tangible asset. Section 2.4 presents hypotheses , 
relating a firm's strategic indicator to risks. Section 2.5 focuses on the data collection 
and the empirical results. The final section offers conclusions with a discussion of this 
chapter's contributions, its limitations and directions for further research. 
2.2 Liquidity-Augmented CAPM 
Liquidity is a broad concept that generally denotes an asset's ability to trade 
large quantities quickly without causing a significant movement in the price and with 
minimum loss of value. It is viewed as an important feature of the investment envi-
ronment and recent studies find that fluctuations in various dimensions of liquidity 
are highly correlated across assets, particularly in a recessionary state (Pastor and 
Stambaugh 2003; Chordia, Roll and Subrahmanyam 2000; Lo and Wang 2000). "Liq-
uidity betas" in stock markets is an important source of priced risk for asset pricing 
and moreover the Fama-French three-factor model has the limited power to describe 
the cross-section of asset returns (Liu 2006; Pastor and Stambaugh 2003; Daniel and 
Titman 1997). 
We introduce a two-factor augmented CAPM that comprises both market and 
liquidity factors , developed by Liu (2006), who constructs the liquidity factor as the 
profits of the mimicking portfolio that buys $1 of the low-liquidity portfolio and sells 
$1 of the high-liquidity portfolio to capture the trading speed dimension of liquidity. 
The new liquidity measure is in compliance with O'Hara (2003), who claims that 
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transactions costs of liquidity and risks of price discovery need to be incorporated 
into asset pricing models. Liu shows that the two-factor model is successful in ex-
plaining the various pricing anomalies documented in the finance literature that both 
the CAPM and the Fama-French three-factor model fail to capture and subsumes 
the effects due to size, book-to-market , cash-flow-to-price, earnings-to-price, dividend 
yield, and long-term contrarian investment. As Fama and French point out in their 
paper (2006), the three-factor model may not be able to explain all asset returns, and 
they advise further work to search for a richer model. We expect that the liquidity-
augmented two-factor model is an especially promising model to analyze our purpose. 
The details of liquidity measure (LIQ) are in Appendix 2. 
Liu (2006) constructed two-factor model based on the CAPM plus the factor LIQ 
that captures liquidity risk. The expected excess return of portfolio i from his model 
is as follows: 
(2 .1) 
where E (ri) is the expected return of the market portfolio, E (LIQ) is the expected 
value of the mimicking liquidity factor, and the factor loadings f3m ,i and Pl,i are the 
slopes in the time-series regression. 
(2.2) 
The two-factor model posits a relationship between the expected excess return of 
an asset and its risk, which is measured by its exposure to two risk factors: overall 
market return (rmt) and the return with the liquidity factors (LIQ). The construction 
of the mimicking liquidity factor , LIQ is similar to the construction of size (SMB) 
and book-to-market (HML) in Fama and French (1993) and the momentum factor in 
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Carhart (1997). The two-factor model implies that the expected excess return of an 
asset is explained by the covariance of its return with the market and the liquidity 
factors. The intercept term ( cxi) is the risk-adjusted return of asset i relative to 
the two-factor model. If the two-factor model explains asset returns, the estimated 
intercept will not be significantly different from zero. 
2.3 Fundamental Strategic Indicator 
The early corporate giants, Standard Oil (Exxon Mobile) and AT&T derived most 
of their value from physical assets. They owned land, machine tools and factories, 
which initially granted significant competitive advantages to their early owners. How-
ever, most physical assets are available to all competitors, which obviously cannot 
generate abnormally high profits and create sustained values. The last half-century 
has created a new generation of firms, such as Coca-Cola, Microsoft, that create more 
than half their profits and shareholder value from intangible assets: brands, techno-
logical expertise (Aswath 2006; Lev 2005). Now, either alone is insufficient to achieve 
superior financial performance. 
Firms are always faced with the fundamental strategic task of balancing the two 
major asset classes, a tangible asset and an intangible asset, deciding a proper amount 
of support for each. Harrison, Hall, and Nargundkar (1991) used resource-based ap-
proach to depict the underlying strategies of the business. Tangible assets contain 
various subclasses, including current assets and fixed assets. Current assets include 
inventory, while fixed assets include such items as buildings and equipment. Intan-
gible assets are nonphysical resources, such as brands, trademarks or patents. Firms 
need to concurrently invest and allocate limited resources between intangible and tan-
gible assets, being required considerable trade-offs and effective strategic management 
76 
based on their product features. As such , we define strategic indicator as a measure 
of shifts in the emphasis on intangibles versus tangibles. 
Two fundamental assets have been highlighted that a firm 's investment driven by 
capital expenditures has been linked to build a tangible asset, whereas a firm 's ability 
to different iate its product though brand-based advertising has been linked to build an 
intangible market-based asset (Barth, Kasznik, and McNichols 2001) . Even though 
other factors, such as R&D, can be regarded as an intangible market-based asset, we 
use advertising expenditure as the influential derivation of an intangible market-based 
asset in the sense that R&D has a very long-term nature of investments rather than 
advertising. On the other hand , advertising is about promoting the differentiation of 
the company which is associated with brands. Brands , more generally, can have a 
very positive impact on a firm 's name value and make its product better known to 
both consumers and investors. Investors prefer investing stocks with high recognition, 
all else being equal. Hence, we define strategic indicator as follows: 
advertising expendituresit - capital expenditureit Strategic I ndicatorit = - ----=--.:;__----------"- ---
total assetsit (2.3) 
Positive values represent a firm that relatively relies on an intangible market-based 
asset and negative values explain that a firm concerns itself with more a tangible asset. 
2.4 Hypotheses 
We develop hypotheses that relate a firm 's strategic indicator to both market and 
liquidity risks. Figure 2. 1 outlines our conceptual framework. 
We first discuss that the contribut ion of brands to a firm 's financial earnings varies 
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widely between industry characteristics and favorably relates to a firm 's strategic 
indicator. A firm, where brand has more power, spends the limited resources more 
on their brand investments, such as a brand logo, a powerful advertising slogan. 
For example, strong brands play a greater role in luxury goods, cosmetic care and 
beverages (soft drinks and beer), whereas other factors rather than brands, such as 
branch location and price , drive a higher proportion of financial earnings to motor 
fuel , mobile networks and IT corporations (MillwardBrown 2005). That is, a firm 
from high-brand-contribution may invest in intangibles more than a firm from low-
brand-contribution. Thus we propose: 
Hl: The higher strategic indicator, the higher contribution of a firm's 
brand to its financial performance. 
Both marketing and finance literature provide clear evidence that brands can have 
a positive impact on financial performance, such as stock market returns and profits 
(Aaker and Jacobson 1994; Srivastava, Shervani and Fahey 1998; Day and Fahey 
1988; Leone 1995; Erickson and Jacobson 1992; Joshi and Hanssens 2004; Madden, 
Fehle and Fournier 2006). 
On the other hand, there are inconsistent findings whether a firm's brand lowers 
its systematic risk by serving as a capital market information channel to shareholders. 
Madden et al. (2006) provide perception between a firm's brand value and systematic 
risk, highlighting a portfolio, combined higher brand values, is less risky. McAlister 
et al. (2007) examines the impact of advertising and R&D on a firm's systematic risk 
and empirically found that both market-based intangible assets lower systematic risk. 
Their empirical results support marketing strategy theory that a strong brand can 
lower the variability of its future cash flows and decrease investors ' perceived risk (Sri-
vastava, Shervani and Fahey 1998; Erdem and Swait 1998). However, Ballester et al. 
(1998) and Ohlson (1995) examined the systematic risk characteristics of growth and 
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value firms and provide a growth firm with a low book-to-market ratio tends to have a 
higher systematic risk than a value firm with a high book-to-market ratio. Moreover , 
he finds that growth firms have greater levels of advertising and R&D intensity than 
value firms. This result is consistent with Lev 's (2005) "partial excludability and non-
marketability" notion, according to which building value on intangible assets, such as 
brands, can have a higher degree of investment risk. 
To integrate the inconsistent views of previous research, we introduce the concept 
of liquidity, novel contribution to this chapter. Grullon et al. (2004) found an interest-
ing result that stock market liquidity favorably reacts when a firm increases its adver-
tising. The evidence that liquidity can be an important state variable for brand-based 
advertising and the inconsistent findings to describe relationships between brands and 
risks motivates us to develop both market (systematic) and liquidity risks, using a 
two-factor augmented CAPM, as we already indicated in the previous section. 
A strong brand decreases the level of perceived risk of having a lower quality 
product than what is promised by the firm or a possible mismatch between product 
characteristics and consumer needs and tastes (Erdem and Swait 1998). Moreover, a 
clear and credible brand tends to have a larger number of both individual and insti-
tutional investors because highly perceived quality by customers may enable the firm 
to accrue greater financial earnings. That is, shareholders, all else being equal, pre-
fer holding stocks with a strong brand, consistent with Merton's investor recognition 
hypothesis. Merton (1987) shows that investors only use securities that they know 
about in constructing their optimal portfolios. Because the lower level of perceived 
risk, derived by a strong and credible brand, tends to have a greater association with 
investor behavior for trading familiar stocks, we may expect a liquidity risk factor, 
derived by trading activity data, can explain the implied role of a brand in reducing 
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perceived risk. 31 This expectation can be supported by market-based asset theory 
that market-based assets increase the level and speed of cash flows and decrease the 
volatility of cash flows, because these variables for cash flows are closely associated 
with stock market liquidity and market liquidity risk is negatively related to cash-flow 
news (Lin, Hsu and Chen 2009).32 Moreover, this is also consistent with Liu (2006)'s 
result that the loadings on the liquidity factor in his liquidity-augmented two-factor 
CAPM increase monotonically from the lowest book to market ratio to the highest 
book to market ratio. Thus, we propose: 
H2: The higher a firm's strategic indicator, the lower its liquidity risk. 
In finance, market risk is the risk associated with overall aggregate market returns. 
That is, the market risk is regarded as a measure of the volatility (sensitivity) of a 
firm's return. Chen and Jian (2006) applied 2000 to 2004 data to study M&A deals 
and found that a high ratio of resource intangibility not only yielded higher returns but 
also increased risk which is consistent with the experience of practitioners. Ballester et 
al. (1998) clearly explain that Fama and French (1996) model measures the additional 
risk of a high book-to-market ratio portfolio , given a specific level of systematic risk, 
which implies that when two firms have the same size and systematic risk, the high 
book-to-market firm has a higher risk than the low book-to market firm. It does not 
mean that the high book-to market firm has a greater systematic and operating risk 
than the low book-market firm. Rather growth firms, which have greater advertising 
intensity, have a higher market risk than value firms due to the greater uncertainty 
of market-based intangible assets. Because the higher level of market risk, derived by 
building value on intangible assets, such as brands, tends to have a greater association 
with a firm's asset structure and activities on two fundamental assets, we may expect 
31 Liu (2006) uses daily trading volume and number of shares outstanding data to demonstrate the 
liquidity measure. 
32 Measurement of cash flow is used to determine problems with a firm's stock market liquidity. 
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a market risk factor can represent the brand as an intangible asset in increasing the 
sensitivity of the firm's stock return to the total market return. Thus , we propose: 
H3: The higher a firm's strategic indicator, the higher its market risk. 
2.5 Data and Empirical Results 
2.5.1 Data Collection 
Interbrand, a reputable institution in branding and brand management, releases a 
yearly list of the best global brands in the Financial Times and, more recently, Busi-
ness Week, by applying widely-used brand valuation method. Many previous studies 
have selected the list to distinguish whether a firm with a strong brand (Fehle, Mad-
den and Fournier 2006; Haigh and Perrier 1997). For the purpose of our research, we 
identified those brands that appeared on the Interbrand list at least once from 2006 to 
2008 as strong brands. Interbrand also categorized those brands from luxury goods, 
hair /facial care and beverages, where a strong brand is very important, to motor fuel, 
IT software/hardware, mobile networks and credit cards, where factors such as price 
and location drive a high proportion of financial earnings. Because of the limitation 
of data collection, we only include the companies which stocks traded on the New 
York Stock Exchange (NYSE), the American Stock Exchange, and NASDAQ. Our 
current brand-focused sample comprises the 19 companies that owned these brands, 
but categorized into two types according to the contribution of brands to a firm's 
financial earnings and characteristics: low contribution of brands and high contribu-
tion of brands, as listed in Table 2.1. We also report the average strategic indicator 
for context. 
In general, including more observations in the finance model (e.g., Fama and 
French three-factor model, Liquidity-Augmented CAPM) is better for estimation. 
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However , it is likely that the value of the true risk factors changes over the period, 
with a long estimation period for risk factors . The resulting estimate for risk factors 
will, therefore, be biased. Nevertheless, using daily data to increase the number of 
observations would result in an increasing amount of noise in the data (Bartholdy and 
Peare 2005). Since marketing variables (i.e., advertising expenditure) change a lot in a 
short period, this also pulls us in the direction of shortening the period. Thus, we used 
monthly data from 1998 to 2008 in the model to estimate market risk and liquidity 
risk. Monthly return, advertising expenditure and capital expenditure come from the 
CRSP /COMPUSTAT, merged (CCM) database, encompassing all stocks traded on 
the major U.S. stock exchanges, namely, NYSE/ AMEX/NASDAQ, over the period 
January 1998 to December 2008. For the test to get significant first moments of risk 
factors in CAPM, we collected data, which is available January 1998 to December 
2008 for NYSE/ AMEX/NASDAQ. Meanwhile, for the t est to get strategic indicator , 
we collected advertising and capital expenditure from 1998 to 2008, corresponding 
with sample of brand-based companies on Interbrand list . 
2.5.2 Empirical R esults 
Table 2.1 presents average strategic indicators for each company. Overall, all 
indicators are in t he expected direction. It obviously shows that oral care (Col-
gate), beverages (Coca-Cola, Pepsi, Coors and Anheuser-Busch), considered as high-
brand-contribution to their financial earnings, tend to spend more on brand-based 
advertising (i.e. , positive strategic indicators), whereas motor fuel (Exxon Mobile), 
mobile networks (AT&T and Verizon) tend to invest more in capital assets (i. e., neg-
ative strategic indicators), such as buildings and machine tools. While luxury goods 
(Tiffany and Polo Ralph Lauren) , IT hardware (Apple) and apparel (specially, Gap) 
have a modest , though acceptable, level of indicator because of their unique charac-
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teristics. For example, other factors, such as store location and raw materials, can 
play a great part to apparel and luxury goods (Gap and Tiffany), as well as a strong 
brand. The positive strategic indicator of Apple is not surprising, given Apple's long-
standing reputation in IT hardware, compared to IBM and Hewlett Packard. Thus, 
we find evidence in support of Hl. 
Table 2.2 shows the intercept and both market and liquidity risk factors in a 
liquidity-augmented CAPM model, using MATLAB. For the constant term ai in 
the equation (2.2) , we can see the two-factor adj usted returns of all companies are 
insignificant (t- stati < 2), which means that the two-factor model explains asset 
returns well. The loadings on the liquidity factor reveal t hat ignoring the liquidity 
factor contaminates the risk measures. 
As such, we decompose total risk into systematic (market or objective) risk and 
perceived (liquidity) risk as liquidity risk in Liu's two-factor CAPM , for a firm 's 
investment decision (Figure 2.1). 
Figure 2.2 shows the plot that depicts the relationship between average strategic 
indicator and liquidity risk for each company. Since we collect all companies from the 
strong brand category in Interbrand, they are likely to have lower liquidity risk factors 
and this path moderately reports that the higher the average strategic indicator , the 
lower the liquidity risk factor. This implies that a firm , focuses on activities that are 
more brand-related because of the more prominent role of the brand in their business 
to consumers and investors, has lower liquidity risk, with a single of exception: IT 
soft/hardware, which we expected to have a somewhat high liquidity risk factor , 
has a very low liquidity risk. It is considered because IT companies, whose R&D 
plays more of a part in the purchase choice, to differentiate their products from 
competitors. Some companies have negative liquidity factor loadings, indicating that 
glamour stocks, such as Apple, IBM, Microsoft and Tiffany, load more on liquid 
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stocks. Thus, we find evidence in support of H2. 
Figure 2.3 shows the plot of the relationship between average strategic indicator 
and market risk for each company. This path depicts that the loadings on the market 
factor generally increase from the lowest average strategic indicator to the highest 
average strategic indicator. The lower average strategic indicator has a significantly 
low market factor loading, indicating that a company, such as Exxon Mobile, Verizon 
and AT&T, relying on more tangible assets like buildings and machinery, has lower 
market risk. A company, has higher average strategic indicator, i.e., Coca-Cola, Nike 
and Colgate, has a higher market risk than others (i.e. , Exxon Mobile and Verizon). 
Thus, we find evidence in support of H3. Notably, this figure is not to say that 
Coca-Cola, Nike and Colgate should make brand-based advertising less of a priority. 
Rather than, we suggest that the company could benefit from managing its brand 
effectively, balancing the market risk and the liquidity risk, from a shareholder-value 
perspective. 
The aggregate model is as follow and the result is in the Table 2.3: 
where, 
Ci r-..J N (0, 0"2 ) 
f3m,i =average market risk for firm i 
f3l,i = average liquidity risk for firm i 




2.6 Conclusions and Directions for Further Research 
It has been argued that building value on brands reduces risk, but compelling 
empirical evidence to support this claim has been lacking. In this chapter, we investi-
gated the trade-off between the role of the brand as an intangible asset in increasing 
market (objective) risk and the brands through effective marketing in reducing liquid-
ity (subjective) risk by shareholders, using a new liquidity-augmented Capital Asset 
Pricing Model and explore what effect market and liquidity risks have on firms , find-
ing ways to more effectively manage their limited resources between intangibles and 
tangibles, shifting a fundamental strategic indicator. We found strong support our 
hypotheses of brand effects on a firm 's effective allocation of its assets. More im-
portantly, we found that a strong brand favorably affected consumers and investors 
choice in all the products we studies. On the other hand, the brand as an intangible 
asset has a higher degree of investment risk. Although the impacts through which the 
role of brands operated differed somewhat across industry characteristics , we found 
that the general impact of brand contribut ion was empirically plausible across the 
firm products we studied. The result we obtained through Liu 's liquidity-augmented 
CAPM estimated suggest that as advertising expenditure increases, the brand lowers 
liquidity risk, associated with perceived risk by consumers and investors, and increases 
market (systematic) risk, associated with asset-market structure. 
A managerial implication of our work is that we integrate the inconsistent views 
of the implied role of the brand in risk from the previous research and make a firm 
effectively allocate its limited organizational resources , avoiding the extreme invest-
ment of brand-based advertising and balancing intangibles with tangibles. It also 
helps companies to make brand repositioning decisions by exploring the risk profiles 
(i.e., market risk and liquidity risk). 
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There are several promising directions of further research to pursue. We found the 
impact of the brand (or brand-based advertising) on risk factors. In sum, increases in 
strategic indicator tend to be associated with lower liquidity risk and higher market 
risk, and decreases in strategic indicator tend to be associated with higher liquidity 
risk and lower market risk. However, those main relationships would be adjusted by 
products ' characteristics. For example, products, which branch location, raw material 
and price also play a greater part to drive a high proportion of financial performance, 
are likely to have both lower market and liquidity risk factors than those, affected only 
from the prominent role of the brand in their business, all else being equal. When we 
briefly look at both figure 2.2 and figure 2.3 (distance between a red point and blue 
line), most companies avoid the extremes and strive to choose an effective strategy 
that balances sufficient support for brand-based advertising expenditure with appro-
priate spending on tangible assets. The impact of brand reputation on both risk 
factors in beverage and face /oral care products, for example, is mitigated in part 
by the other factors, such as store location and price, while we expected that they, 
as high-brand-contribution, have the lower liquidity risk and the higher market risk 
than products as low-brand-contribution. Furthermore, R&D expenditure may be 
an important variable to explain the impact of the role of intangible assets, because 
IT soft/hardware (Adobe and Apple) have relatively lower liquidity risk and higher 
market risk, even though they are regarded as low-brand-contribution. On the other 
hand , the impact would also be moderated by the strength of the brand 's relationship 
with customers and shareholders. It would be interesting to test the model combin-
ing with these variables. Finally, another direction for further research would be to 
investigate the brands in other countries, with International CAPM, to enhance the 
generalizability of our results . 
86 





Investment Contribution I 
Effort liquidity Risk 
(Subjective Risk) 






Mobile ~--fl AT&T I 





::J -0.4 ~. ·~ . lrillany l 
-0.6 
jMicrosott l ~ "' IApplel 
a HewleU 
-0 .8 Packard 
- I 
- ~-~ -':::2-----:_o~. l:-;5-----:.oc'-_ ,:-----_-:co_c!:-o5;:-----+-----:o'"'. o!:-;5,.-----:o:-'-. :-, ------;;--!0.15 
Stral e gic In dic6l or 





¢~ ~ _--<:;;.'-='---' 
~dob: l • l Microsoft I 
~ l .verizon I 0.8 
0.6 
0~ _L2-----:_0~. 1~5-----:~-----70 .705;:-----+-----:0;-,. 0~5,.----0~. ~1---~0 . 1" 5 
Stral e gic In dical or 
87 
88 
Table 2.1 Brands Categories and Strategic Indicators 
Where brand has the most power Where brand has the least power 
Luxury: Motor Fuel: 
Tiffany (-0.003) Exxon Mobile (-0.100) 
Polo Ralph Lauren (-0 .013) IT Software: 
Soft Drinks: Adobe (-0.011) 
Coca Cola (0.019) Microsoft ( -0.003) 
Pepsi (0. 008) Credit Cards: 
Beer: American Express (-0.002) 
Molson Coors (0.092) Mobile Networks: 
Anheuser-Busch (0.010) Verizon (-0.093) 
Apparel: AT&T (-0.075) 
Gap (-0.048) IT Hardware: 
Nike (0 .125) IBM (-0.041) 
Face/Body Care: Apple (0.011) 
Avon (-0.017) Hewlett Packard (-0 .018) 
Colgate (0.039) 
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Table 2.2 Market Risk and Liquidity Risk 
Company a fJMarket fJ Liquidity 
Adobe 0.026 (0.21) 0.869 (7.02) -1.020 (-8.90) 
I American Express -0.005 (-0.09) 0.779 (30.05) 0.652 (12.08) 
I Anheuser-Busch 0.008 (0.15) 1.067 (13.11) 0.181 (3.53) 
I Apple 0.038 (0.30) 1.388 (10.66) -0.541 (-3.26) 
I AT&T -0.001 ( -0.01) 0.898 (11.80) 0.431 (5.32) 
I Avon 0.004 (0.04) 1.426 (14.22) 0.270 (7.74) 
I Coca Cola -0.005 (-0.07) 1.622 (12.29) 0.239 (7.61) 
I Colgate 0.005 (0.07) 1.092 (10.46) 0.164 (3.61) 
I Coors 0.008 (0.15) 1.310 (9 .14) 0.224 (3 .16) 
I Exxon 0.008 (0.15) 0.452 (9.14) 0.490 (3.16) 
I Gap 0.007 (0.07) 1.052 (10.28) -0.355 (-3.47) 
Hewlett Packard 0.014 (0.16) 0.773 (9.14) -0.686 (-10.73) 
IBM 0.008 (0.12) 0.910 (13.21) -0.365 (-5.97) 
Microsoft 0.009 (0.11) 0.921 (10.54) -0.521 (-5 .97) 
Nike 0.008 (0.09) 1.035 (10.32) 0.033 (4.62) 
Pepsi 0.007 (0.08) 1.348 (20.10) 0.328 (12.43) 
Polo 0.007 (0.08) 1.112 (12.84) -0.158 ( -3 .07) 
Verizon 0.006 (0 .01) 0.741 (9 .97) 0.437 (2.38) 
Tiffany 0.016 (0.18) 1.479 (16 .56) -0.405 (-4 .53) 
Numbers in p arent heses are t- s t atistics. 
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Table 2.3 Significant Test Result 
Intercept Slope 
Liquidity Risk -0.035 -0.670 
(-0.07) (-2 .45) 
Market Risk 1.0841 2.7042 
( 4. 17) (10.39) 
Numbers m parentheses are t - statisttcs. 
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Appendix 2 
To fully facilitate the understanding of the liquidity measure, we summarize Liu (2006) 
liquidity measure of a security, LM12 , as the standardized turnover-adjusted number 
of zero daily trading volumes over the prior 12 months: 
Ll'Vh2 = Numbers of zerodailyvolumesinprior 12months + x --[ 
1/ (12- month turnover)] 21x 
Deflator NoTD 
where 12 month turnover is turnover over the prior 12 months, calculated as the sum 
of daily turnover over the prior 12 months, daily turnover is the ratio of the number 
of shares traded on a day to the number of shares outstanding at the end of the day, 
NoT D is the total number of trading days in the market over the prior 12 months, 
and D eflator is chosen 11 ,000. He found that using 12-month turnover is better 
than shorter period such as one month or six months to construct liquidity measure 
because it distinguished some illiquidity stock whose daily trading volumes are equal 
to zero (i.e., lack of demand) . 
To construct a liquidity factor, ideally one would follow P astor and Stambaugh 
(2003) and construct a market-wide liquidity measure, then use the shock or inno-
vation in market liquidity as the liquidity factor. However, there are two major 
problems with constructing a liquidity factor in this way. First , it is inappropriate 
to estimate the liquidity shock using the liquidity measure LM12. Second, trading 
volumes are recorded differently for NYSE/ AMEX and NASDAQ stocks. To circum-
vent these issues in estimating the innovations in market liquidity, Liu constructs 
a mimicking liquidity factor, LIQ , based on the liquidity measure of LNI12 using 
NYSE/ AMEX/NASDAQ ordinary common stocks. 
To construct the mimicking liquidity factor , LIQ , Liu sort all NYSE/ AMEX or-
dinary common stocks in ascending order based on t heir liquidity measures, at the 
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beginning of each month from July 1963 to July 2003. Independently, he sorts all 
NASDAQ ordinary common stocks in ascending order on the mimicking liquidity fac-
tor at the beginning of each month from January 1984 to July 2003. Based on the 
two independent sorts, he forms two portfolios, low-liquidity and high-liquidity, as 
follows: 
• Before 1984, low liquidity contains the lowest-liquidity NYSE/ AMEX stocks 
based on a 15% NYSE breakpoint . From January 1984 onwards, low-liquidity 
contains the lowest-liquidity NYSE/ AMEX stocks based on the 15% NYSE 
breakpoint plus the 35% lowest-liquidity NASDAQ stocks. 
• Before 1984, high-liquidity contains the highest-liquidity NYSE/ AMEX stocks 
based on a 35% NYSE breakpoint. From J anuary 1984 onwards, high-liquidity 
contains the highest-liquidity NYSE/ AMEX stocks based on the 35% NYSE 
breakpoint plus the 15% highest-liquidity NASDAQ stocks. 
The two portfolios (high-liquidity and low-liquidity) are held for six months after 
portfolios formation. The 6-month holding period is chosen because it gives a mod-
erate liquidity premium compared with the 1- and 12-month holding periods, which 
seems plausible for estimating the liquidity factor. He then construct the liquidity 
factor as the monthly profits from buying one dollar of equally weighted low-liquidity 
and selling one dollar of equally weighted high-liquidity. 
Chapter 3 
Negligence and Two-Sided Causation33 
3.1 Introduction 
This paper consists of a core model with extensions. The core model is based 
loosely on the facts of Grimstad v. ABC. In Grimstad the plaintiff 's decedent , captain 
of a covered barge, drowned aft er falling off the barge when it was accidentally bumped 
by another ship, while lying in port. The captain 's wife, who was with captain at the 
time of the accident, brought suit on the theory that t he barge owner was negligent 
in failing to install life-buoys. If life-buoys had been on the boat, according to the 
wife's theory, she would have been able to grab one and throw it to the captain to 
save his life. The appellate court held that although the defendant was negligent , 
as found by the trial court , in failing to equip the boat with life-buoys, there was 
no evidence showing that the captain's wife would have been able to find one and 
throw it in t ime to save the captain . Since the evidence suggested that the captain 's 
drowning would have occurred even if the barge had been equipped with life-buoys, 
the plaintiff's negligence lawsuit failed on factual causation grounds. 
The causation problem in Grimstad is one in which the defendant 's care depends 
on an intervention that determines whether care will be effective. Having life-buoys 
33This chapter is adapted from a paper co-authored with Keith N. Hylton . 
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on board is effective only if someone can grab them and throw them in time to save 
the person who has fallen overboard. 
Hylton and Lin (2011) present a model of the causation problem in Grimstad, and 
analyze incentives to take care in that setting. In this paper, we extend that model 
to what we refer to as two-sided causation problems. 
In the two-sided causation problem the effectiveness of the defendant's care typ-
ically depends on some intervention, as in the Grimstad case. In addition to this , 
the risk of harm generated by the defendant 's failure to take care depends on some 
intervention. 
Given the ubiquity of intervening factors, every negligence case could be viewed 
as a two-sided causation case, depending on the granularity with which one identifies 
intervening causal factors. Even in the simple automobile accident, the effectiveness 
of care in maintaining a breaking system depends on the attentiveness of the driver 
(an intervening factor on the care side), and the dangerousness of failing to take care 
depends on the presence and position of potential victims (an intervening factor on 
the harm side). 
But courts do not view every negligence case as presenting a two-sided causation 
problem. The causation question arises only in specific cases where the facts raise an 
obvious question whether the actor should be considered negligent in light of the low 
probability of intervention. 
Boat Safety Scenario 
The first two sided causation scenario we consider is a generalization of the Grim-
stad scenario. Recall that in Grimstad, the captain fell overboard after his barge was 
bumped by another boat. The bump by another boat is itself an intervention that 
dramatically increased the risk of drowning. 
In this scenario we will assume that the risk of drowning is minimal unless there 
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is an intervening bump by a third party. Thus, there are two potential interventions 
that affect the productivity of care . One intervention is on the care side: care is 
ineffective unless someone can get to a life-buoy on time to save the drowning victim. 
The other intervention is on the carelessness side: failing to take care (that is, failing 
to install life-buoys) does not increase the risk of injury unless the third-party bumps 
the boat. 
In the one-sided intervention case, examined in Hylton and Lin (2011), the pri-
vately optimal level of care may deviate from the socially optimal level. We examine 
the deviation from optimal care in the two-sided scenario here. 
Safe Lock Scenario I 
Another set of two-sided causation scenarios involves the decision to lock some-
thing that might be valuable to keep it out of the hands of thieves. Suppose, for 
example, a hotel or jewelry store has a choice whether to purchase a safe in which to 
store valuable items. For the safe to be effective against thieves, however, someone 
tending the safe has to lock it. On the other hand , failing to lock the safe is not an 
issue if the thieves never attempt to steal. In this scenario, there are two types of 
intervention that affect the productivity of care: intervention on the care side (locking 
the safe), and intervention on the harm side (by thieves). 
Safe Lock Scenario II 
In the previous scenarios the risk of an intervention leading to injury was assumed 
not to depend on whether the actor took care. In the boat safety scenario it was 
assumed that the probability of a boat bumping the barge does not depend on whether 
the barge has installed life-buoys. In Safe Lock Scenario I we assumed that the 
probability that thieves would attempt to steal does not depend on whether a safe 
was present. 
But in many instances , taking care does affect the probability that an intervening 
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actor will strike. Consider, for example, the risk of a car theft as a function of the 
safety measures taken by the car owner. If the owner is careless, and leaves his keys in 
a visible spot in the car, then an intervening actor (thief) may open the car and drive 
off' with it. On the other hand, if t he owner is careful , taking his keys and locking 
his car door, it is still possible that a thief will steal the car. But the probability of 
car theft is clearly higher when the owner leaves the keys in the car in a visible spot. 
Alternatively, consider locking windows in a house. Leaving the windows open makes 
it easy for a burglar to enter. Locking the windows does not foreclose the possibility 
of a burglary; it only reduces the probability of a burglary. Although there is only 
one intervening actor in these examples , these are still cases of two-sided causation, 
because the probability of intervention depends on whether the actor takes care. 
It is easy to modify the foregoing examples to allow for two intervening acts. 
Return to the safe lock example. For the safe to be eff'ective, the person tending the 
safe must remember to lock it . However, thieves might be less likely to attempt to 
steal when they are aware that a safe is present. The thieves might assume that the 
safe is locked, and decide to find some other store or hotel where the owners do not 
use safes. 
We will start with an analysis of the simple, single-sided causation scenario, and 




We assume taking care affects the probability of an accident, but the eff'ect is 
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conditional on an intervention. For example, suppose the type of care is installation of 
life-preservers on a boat. The life-preservers will be effective in preventing a drowning 
only if they are deployed rapidly and accurately, which is not guaranteed. Thus, taking 
care by installing life-preservers is effective in reducing the probability of an injury 
only if there is the intervention of effective deployment. 
Let r =the probability of an injury given that the injurer does not take care . In 
the scenario under consideration, r is the probability of a drowning when the boat 
is not equipped with life preservers. Let s =the probability of an intervention that 
makes care effective , w =the probability of an injury if the intervention occurs, w < r. 
Let x =the cost of taking care, and let L =the loss suffered by the accident victim. 
The causation problem described so far is captured in the following tree diagram. 
Figure 3.1 Causation Event Diagram 





No Intervention Injury 
1-s 
Before the injurer chooses how much care to take, the probability of intervention 
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is unknown; only its distribution is known. Some time after the injurer invests in 
care, the actual intervention probability s0 is revealed and an accident occurs. 
The court can observe the actual intervention probability s0 when it determines 
liability at the final stage, while the injurer cannot observe it ex ante. The injurer's 
care decision is a durable type of precaution that affects the probability of an accident 
once the intervention probability is realized later. As a result, it is possible for the 
injurer to be negligent on an ex ante evaluation, and non-negligent under an ex post 
evaluation. 
Let the intervention probability be governed by the distribution G (s) with cor-
responding density g (s). Recall that the injurer knows the distribution of the inter-
vention probability when he decides whether to take care. The court, with limited 
information, does not know the distribution of the intervention probability, though it 
sees the actual intervention probability s0 . 
Taking care is socially desirable if the expected social cost when the injurer takes 
care is less than the expected social cost when the injurer does not take care: 
x + (11 (sw + (1- s) T) g (s) ds) L < TL (3.1) 
where E (s) = J01 sg (s), the expected value of the intervention probability. 
Now consider the injurer 's incentive to take care under the negligence rule. When 
the injurer takes care, he will face no liability under the negligence rule. Thus , when 
the injurer takes care the only cost he bears is x. When the injurer does not take 
care, he will be liable for the victim's loss, but only if the victim's negligence claim 
satisfies the factual causation test. 
Following Shavell (1980) , Posner and Landes, and Hylton and Lin (2011), we 
will treat the causation test as an ex post negligence inquiry - an assessment based 
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on the observation of the intervention probability. Under the ex post assessment of 
negligence, the injurer will be held liable if he fails to take care and, under the partie-
ular realization of the intervention probability, say s0 , care would have been socially 
beneficial x < (r- (s0w + (1 - s0 ) r)) L , which is equivalent to x < (r- w) s0 L or: 
X (3.2) (r- w) L <so 
So that the injurer's decision will be interesting in a causation analysis, we as-
sume x < (r - w) L, which means that the injurer is potentially negligent . Using 
equation (3.2) , the probability that the injurer will be held liable for negligence is 
1- G (x/ [('r- w) L]). He takes care under the negligence test when 
(3.3) 
because with probability G (x/ [(r- w) L]) he will not be held liable under the ex 
post assessment of negligence. 
The care-taking condition implicitly defines a specific precaution cost level, , below 
which the injurer will take care and above which the injurer will not take care. In 
plain terms, one can describe as the cost of care for the marginal actor - the one who 
is just indifferent between taking care and not taking care. Using equations (3.1) and 
(3.3), the incentive for care is socially optimal ifx = ('r- w) E (s) L, socially excessive 
if x > (r- w) E (s) L, and socially inadequate if x < ('r- w) E (s) L. Hylton and Lin 
(2011) prove the following propo_sition. 
Proposition 1: The negligence-causation test leads to socially excessive care if 
(r- w) E (s) < r [1- G (E (s))]. Care is socially optimal if equality holds and socially 
inadequate if the inequality is reversed. 
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A short-hand approach to measuring the incentive distortion is to examine how 
far apart are the marginal private benefit of care and the marginal social benefit of 
care when the agent 's cost of care is equal to the marginal social benefit of care. That 
measure is equal to L {(r- w) E (s)- r [1 - G (E (s))]}, which is negative in the case 
of a distortion toward excessive care and positive in the case of a distortion toward 
inadequate care . Letting D represent the distortion: 
D _ _ (1- G (E (s))) 
- <p E(s) (3.4) 
where <p = (r- w) Jr . The term <p captures the productivity of care. Since the 
difference between the private and social marginal benefit of care is equal to DL, a 
change in the amount of the victim's loss has no effect on the direction of inefficiency, 
just the size. 
For comparison purposes we consider examples in which we calculate the relative 
size of the incentive distortion for a fixed value of the loss L. For these comparisons 
it is sufficient to look only at D . 
Simulation 1: Causation and Care: Exponential Distribution Case 
This example examines the relationship between privately and socially optimal 
care levels when the probability of intervention follows an exponential distribution: 
11 s E (s) = >. 1 ds = o 1- e-x- (3.5) 
1E(s) le ->-.x ( 1 ) -E(s) G(E(s))= >. -=l.dx= -=1. [1-e- >-.- J o 1-e>-. 1-e>-. (3.6) 
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-E(s) 
D _ !n _ (1- G (E (s))) = !n _ -----;o--1 -----,----e="=--------,---c;-
- r E ( s) r A [ 1 - ( 1 + t e ~1)] (3.7) 
The graph below shows a regions in the parameter space in which the actor takes 
socially excessive care, socially inadequate care and optimal care. The vertical axis is 
cp, which measures the productivity of care. As cp goes from zero to one, care becomes 
more productive. The horizontal axis is the distribution parameter A, which is equal 
to the expected value of the intervention probability. Thus as A approaches infinity, 
the expected value of the intervention probability approaches infinity. Inadequate 
care is the most likely outcome as A approaches infinity, which is a basic prediction 
of this model. 
The optimal care curve represents the parameter values for which D = 0; that 
is, the parameter values for which the negligence-causation test generates socially 
optimal care. 
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Simulation 2: Causation and Care, Beta Distribution Case 
In the simulation below, we allow for the intervention probability to have a beta 
distribution. The advantage of the beta distribution is that it permits us to examine 
the incentives for care as the signal distribution changes from symmetrical to skewed 
(in either direction) , 
In Figure 3.3 below we graph the value of D the distortion measure as a function of 
the mean of the signal distribution (which is equal to a/ (a + .B)). We used different 
values for the productivity of care cp , shown in the box in Figure 3.3 . The distortion 
curve shifts up as the productivity of care increases . The dashed curve is associated 
with a value of r.p of 2/3. The dotted curve is associated with a r.p value of roughly 
.89. The diamond-dotted curve is associated with a r.p value of roughly .95. The solid 
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black curve is associated with a 'P value of 0.5. 34 
As we increase the mean of the beta-distributed signal, we move from a signal dis-
tribution that is skewed left to one that is skewed right. The symmetrical distribution 
is represented by the midpoint along the horizontal axis, where a/ (a+ /3 ) = 0.5. 
In plotting the curves shown in Figure 3.3, we assumed a + f3 = 20. In or-
der to change the degree of skewness of the distribution, we moved the parameters , 
in one-digit increments, from the combination {a= 1, f3 = 19} to the combination 
{a = 19, f3 = 1}, and plot ted the distortion measure for each of the corresponding 
values of a/ (a+ (3 ). In other words, the values of a/ (a+ (3 ) begin at 1/20 and run 
up to 19/ 20. 
Where the distortion variable is negative, the actor takes excessive care. Inad-
equate care is associated with positive distortion values. Optimal care is observed 
where the distortion value is equal to zero. 
Figure 3.3 indicates that there is a tendency toward excessive care under the 
negligence-causation test. For most of the distribution patterns simulated the dis-
tortion measure is negative. This is a counterintuitive finding, given that ones' first 
inclination is to think that the causation requirement reduces the scope of liability, 
and should therefore result in a weaker incentive for care. 
The three highest curves in Figure 3.3 cross the zero distortion line, which means 
that there exists a set of parameter values , under the three highest assumed produc-
tivity of care levels ('P ;:? 0.66) , for which care is socially optimal. The dashed curve , 
which graphs distortion levels with 'P = 0.66, crosses the zero distortion line (optimal 
care) when the signal mean value (a/ (a+ (3 )) is roughly equal to .85 . The dotted 
curve ('P = 0.89) crosses the zero line when a/ (a+ (3 ) = 0.6. The diamond-dotted 
curve ( 'P = 0. 95) crosses the zero line when a/ (a + (3) = 0. 55. The solid black curve 
34 We used <p = (2/3 - 1/3) / (2/3) = 0.5 for the solid black curve. 














Figure 3.3 Causation and Care, Beta Distribution Case 
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This simulation implies that in order to avoid the socially excessive care outcome, 
both the productivity of care and the signal mean have to have relatively high values. 
Specifically, for optimal care to be observed under the negligence test , the degree of 
the productivity of care must be above a certain threshold and the signal distribution 
must be sufficiently skewed to the right. This suggests that there are many natural 
settings in which excessive care will be observed. 
Two-Sided Causation 
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In this part we model the two-sided causation scenarios described in the Intro-
duction. For ease of comparison, we will start with the Boat Safety Scenario, since 
it is similar to the single-sided causation model examined in the preceding section of 
this paper. After examining the two--sided causation models, which are by no means 
exhaustive of the types of cases in which the two-sided causation problem arises, 
we examine simulations of these models. We compare the results of the single-sided 
model simulations to those of the two-sided model simulations in order to determine 
whether the degree of distortion from optimal care appears to be greater in the two-
sided scenario. We find that the degree of distortion is greater. 
Boat Safety Scenario II 
In the previous model, causation was only "one sided" in the sense that there was 
only one intervention that could influence the outcome of the negligence test, and 
that intervention affected only the productivity of care. 
In this part, we expand the model to allow for "two sided" causation. Continuing 
with the same hypothetical based on Grimstad, suppose the risk of injury depends on 
the conduct of an intervening actor. Specifically, suppose that the risk of drowning 
increases dramatically only if the captain's barge is bumped by another boat. 
Let q =the probability that an intervening injurer appears (e.g., the barge 1s 
bumped by another boat). We will assume that q is a random variable, like the other 
intervention probability s, and that it is independent of s. The probability of injury 
is given byE (q) r + (1- E (q)) w . 
Given these assumptions, taking care (by installing life-buoys) is socially desirable 
if 
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x + E (q) [E (s) w + (1- E (s)) r] L + [1- E (q)] wL < E (q) rL + (1- E (q)) wL 
(3.8) 
which is equivalent to x < E (q) E (s) (r- w) L. 
It follows from the earlier analysis that the injurer will be found negligent under 
the ex post evaluation if 
X (3.9) (r- w) L < soqo 
Thus, if we let z = sq and H (z) represents the cumulative density function for z, 
then he takes care under the negligence test when 
(3.10) 
which is equivalent to the single-sided causation scenario except for the nature of the 
distribution function . 
Proposition 2: Th e negligence-causation test leads to socially excessive care if 
(r- w) E (s) E (q) < r [1- H (E (s) E (q))]. Care is socially optimal if equality holds 
and socially inadequate if the inequality is reversed. 
The incentive distortion measure for this scenario is as follows: 
D = (r- w) _ (1- H (E (s) E (q))) 
r E(s)E(q) (3.11) 
where D < 0 implies that the negligence-causation test generates socially excessive 
care. D = 0 is associated with optimal care, and D > 0 is associated with inadequate 
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care. 
Safe Lock Scenario 
Another set of two-sided causation scenarios that are similar to the one just studied 
involves the locking of a safe or some durable precaution designed to prevent an 
injury. The obvious example is one in which a hotel purchases a safe for the storage 
of valuables. The safe is effective, however , only if the hotel employees remember to 
lock it. In addition, nothing will happen unless thieves attempt to steal valuables 
from the hotel. 
Here is an alternative version of the same scenario. Suppose a railroad is trans-
porting a dangerous chemical through a populated area. The railroad must decide 
whether to purchase a special lock for the release valve on the tank car holding the 
chemical. If it purchases the lock, someone must remember to actually lock the valve. 
In general, however, the risk of spillage is low unless an intervening actor deliberately 
opens the valve to release the chemical. 
In this class of scenarios the effectiveness of taking care, by purchasing a lockable 
barrier , depends on whether the actor takes the intervening step of engaging the 
lock. On the other hand, the risk of an injury is minimal unless the intervening actor 
attempts to breach the barrier. 
Let s =the probability that the actor engages the lock, and q =the probability that 
the intervening actor attempts to breach the barrier. We assume, as in the previous 
part, that the probability of attempting to breach the barrier is not dependent on the 
likelihood of a barrier existing. 
Taking care is socially desirable under the following condition: 
x + E (s) wL + (1- E (s)) [E (q) r + (1- E (q)) w] L < E (q) rL + (1- E (q)) wL 
(3.12) 
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which simplifies to: 
x < E (q) E (s) (r- w) L 
Simulation 3: Causation and Care, Beta Distribution Case 
In this part we simulate incentives for care for the two-sided causation scenarios 
examined previously (Boat Safety II, Safe Lock). 
The interesting question is whether the distortion from socially optimal care is 
greater in the two-sided causation scenario than in the one-sided scenario. Since the 
answer to this question depends on assumptions with respect to the productivity of 
care ( <p) and the distributions of the intervention probabilities, we use simulations to 
examine the distortion from optimal care . 
Following the same approach as in Figure 3.3, we allowed for the signals q and s to 
have Beta distributions where s is distributed Betas (a, (3) and q is distributed Betaq 
(!' , o) . The x axis in Figure 3.4 measures the product of the two mean signal values. 
The parameters for each of the distributions sum to 20 (i.e., a+ (3 = 20,1 + o = 20) . 
In carrying out the simulation, we fixed the degree of skewness on the s distribution 
and allowed the other to move from left skew to right skew. This allows us to replicate 
the simulation approach taken with the single-signal case examined earlier in Figure 
3.3. 
Specifically, the dark line fixes the distribution of s at the symmetric position and 
permits the distribution of q to run from a strong left skew to a strong right skew. 
As the skew moves from left to right, the value on the horizontal axis, (a/(a + (3)) x 
( 1 j ( 1 + o)), moves from left to right. We repeated the same exercise with different 
assumptions on a and (3 shown below. 
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The goal of this exercise is to see if the degree of distortion is lessened in the two 
signal case relative to the one signal case. This is a plausible inquiry because one 
might think that distortions observed in the one-signal case might be cancelled out 
in the two-signal case. A tendency toward excessive care induced by the distribution 
of one signal might be counterbalanced by a tendency toward inadequate induced by 
the distribution of the second signal. 
However, we find, as Figure 3.4 illustrates , that the degree of distortion toward 
excessive care increases in the two-sided causation scenario. As Figure 3.4 shows, 
the distortion levels are greater than in the one-sided causation scenario simulated in 
Figure 3.3. 
Moreover, in order to find a set of parameter values which generated socially 
optimal care taking, we had to set the productivity of care at the highest level ( <p = 
(0.95-0.05)/0.95 ~ 0.95) . For care productivity levels <p = 0.66 and <p = 0.89, care is 
socially excessive for all of the beta parameter combinations tested. 
The dotted curve in Figure 3.4 is the only one that crosses the zero distortion line 
and that crossing occurs where the value on the horizontal axis is 0.87. The dotted 
curve represents t he most extreme right skew combination that we could implement in 
this simulation. For the dotted curve, sis distributed Betas (19,1) and q is permitted 
to move from a strong left skew (Betaq (1, 19)) to a strong right skew ((Betaq (19,1)). 
Yet, even in this case, negative distortion values - signaling socially excessive care -
are observed for all but two of the parameter combinations used for the q distribution. 
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3.3 Conclusion 
What distinguishes causation cases is that there is typically an intervention that 
occurs after the injurer commits to a durable care level. The intervention on the 
care side (locking the safe), and intervention on the harm side (by thieves) in Safe 
Lock Scenario. These intervention probabilities can be treated as two signals that 
are revealed only after the accident occurs. Courts are able to look at these signals , 
without knowing its distribution, while injurers choose a care level with knowledge 
only of each signal's distribution. We have extended Hylton and Lin (2011)'s one-
sided causation model to what we refer to as two-sided causation problems. 
We find that in the most plausible scenarios the causation test generally leads to 
excessive care (D < 0). Under certain conditions the causation test generates optimal 
care, and the specific conditions we derive in t his model are consistent with earlier 
articles that find that the causation test generates optimal care. Our model also 
provides a more formal treatment of the problem of uncertainty in the application of 
t he causation test. 
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